Arguing Affect: The Rhetoric of Peripheral Persuasion. by Hershey, Lewis Blaine, II
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1988
Arguing Affect: The Rhetoric of Peripheral
Persuasion.
Lewis Blaine Hershey II
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation




The most advanced technology has been used to photo­
graph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm 
master. UMI films the original text directly from the copy 
submitted. Thus, some dissertation copies are in typewriter 
face, while others may be from a computer printer.
In the unlikely event tha t the author did not send UMI a 
complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will 
be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyrighted material had to 
be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
Oversize m aterials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are re­
produced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper 
left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal 
sections with small overlaps. Each oversize page is available 
as one exposure on a standard 35 mm slide or as a 17" x 23" 
black and white photographic print for an additional charge.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been 
reproduced xerographically in this copy. 35 mm slides or 
6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for 
any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for 
an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.
HI UMI
Accessing the World’s Information since 1938 
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA

Order N um ber 8819947
Arguing affect: The rhetoric of peripheral persuasion
Hershey, Lewis Blaine, II, Ph.D.
The Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical Col., 1988
UMI
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

PLEASE NOTE:
In all cases this material has been filmed in the best possible way from the available copy. 
Problems encountered with this docum ent have been identified here with a  check mark V .
1. Glossy photographs or pages  _____
2. Colored illustrations, paper or prin t __
3. Photographs with dark background v / ^
4. Illustrations are poor copy
5. Pages with black marks, not original copy ^
6. Print shows through as there is text on both sides of p a g e _______
7. Indistinct, broken or small print on several pages
8. Print exceeds margin requirem ents______
9. Tightly bound copy with print lost in sp ine________
10. Computer printout pages with indistinct print
11. Page(s)____________ lacking when material received, and  not available from school or
author.
12. Page(s)____________ seem to be missing in numbering only as text follows.
13. Two pages num bered  . Text follows.
14. Curling and wrinkled p a g e s______
15. Dissertation contains pages with print a t a  slant, filmed a s  received_________
16. Other ___  _______ __________ ______________ ___________ _________________
UMI

ARGUING AFFECT: THE RHETORIC OF PERIPHERAL PERSUASION
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agriculutural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
i n
The Department of Speech Communication, Theatre, 
and Communication Disorders
by
Lewis Blaine Hershey, II 
B. A., The University of North Carolina, 1981 
M. A., The University of North. Carolina, 1985
May 1988
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1
CHAPTER TWO 27
CHAPTER THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  58
CHAPTER FOUR . . . . . . . . .  ...............  . . . .  96
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  122
APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  138
VITA  ................................................. 142
i i
ABSTRACT
This study explores the theoretical parameters of
peripheral persuasion. Chapter one reviews social
scientific approaches to the study of persuasion from
researchers in communication theory, psychology, and
marketing. This review reveals a bifurcation of the 
persuasion concept into cognitive and affective dimensions. 
After demonstrating a bias in social scientific research for 
the cognitive dimensions of persuasion, chapter one links 
the affective dimensions of persuasion with the concept of 
peripheral persuasion and emerging trends in rhetorical 
theory that emphasize narrative models of communication.
Chapter two scrutinizes the distinction between 
cognitive or central routes to persuasion and affective or
peripheral routes to persuasion in terms of The Elaboration 
Likelihood Model of Persuasion developed by Cacioppo and
Petty Cl984a). The chapter further considers the tenets of
the model in light of recent criticism of the ELM by Stiff
t.1986) and Stiff and Boster (1987).
Chapter three develops a rhetoric of peripheral
persuasion by placing the concept of peripheral persuasion 
in the context of emerging theories of narrative based upon 
narrative models (Fisher, 1984). The chapter further
examines criticism of Fisher's model by Rowland (1987) and 
Warnick (1987). The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
how peripheral persuasion is consistent with non—
controversial elements of narrative models of rhetorical 
theory.
Chapter four demonstrates the explanatory power of the 
rhetoric of peripheral persuasion. Using print
advertisements from a recent Benson Hedges campaign (1987) 
this chapter illustrates the usefulness of a theory of
peripheral persuasion for linking theoretical and social 
scientific approaches to the study of persuasion. The
chapter also includes a discussion of non-print peripheral 
persuasion contexts.
CHAPTER ONE
Statement of the Problem
Recent trends in rhetorical theory and criticism
i nd.i cate an i nterest i n non-tr ad.i t i onal coneeptual i at i on
and application of argument and rhetoric (Conley, 1984? 
Fisher, 197S, 1980, 1984, 1985a, 1985b; Frentz, 1985;
Kauffman, 1981; □’'Keefe; 1977; and Willard, 19 SO) „ For 
example, Kauffman Cl981) asserts that charaeters in a p1 ay 
argue through their gestures and actions as well as their 
words Cpp. 407-408). Fisher (1984) maintains that argument 
r esi des i n al 1 for ms of symbolie act i vi t y, d i sc ursive as 
well as nondiscursive (p. 8). Moreover this trend reveals a 
growing eclecticism in the development of rhetorical theory. 
Specifically the roots of this eclecticism may be traced 
through decades of scholarship in such diverse fields as 
psychology, anthropology, literary criticism, marketing,
and, of course, rhetoric.
In these diverse fields the primary area of shared
interest in argument lies in the study of persuasion (e.g. 
Burke, 1969b; Cacioppo and Petty, 1979; Coffman, 1959;
Hi rschman and Ho 1 br ook, 19S2; HovI and , Jan i s , and l<e 11 ey ,
1953? Pet t y and Cacioppo, .1.979, 1983; and Ryan and Bon field,
1975),, Indeed perhaps not since Plato and the Sophists has 
so much a11enti on been gi ven to t he study and practice of 
persuasive communication. For the most part study has
concentr at ed on t he hypothesis that c ogni t i ve processes 
mediate persuasive appeals within individuals.
The focus on the role of cognitive processes is not 
surprising. At least since Aristotle (.'Roberts and Bywater, 
trans., 1984), appeals to reasoned audience consideration of
persuasive discourse have been the preferred paradigm of 
scholars and researchers alike. As investigators in fields 
such as psychology, anthropology, and marketing began to 
develop models of persuasion, cognitive processing of 
information often figured prominently in research efforts 
(Bandura, 1977? Derryberry and Rothbart, 1984; Edell and
St ae1i n, 1983; Engel, B1ackwe11, and Mini ard, i98E; Fi shbei n
and Ajzen, 1975; Goffman, 1959; Hoviand and Janis, 1959;
Izard, Kagan , and Za jonc , 1984; Ke 11 y, 1981; Li 111 e.john ,
1978; Petty and Cacioppo, 1979; Ryan and Bon field, 1975; 
Zajonc and Markus, 1984).
However, research on the role of cognition in 
persuasion often obscures another trend in persuasion
research: Scholarship that explores the persuasive
di mension of af f ec t sans coqni t i on in communi cat ive 
processes. Scholars such as Fisher and Kauffman implicitly
recognize this trend- Fisher notes that public opinion and 
morality on issues like nuclear disarmament cam not be
understood as the result of strictly rational, logical 
appeals» Kauf fman suggests that dr amat i c per for mance, 
including the actions of the characters, functions 
argumentati vely.
In a rush to embrace eclecticism, scholars in rhetoric 
continue to examine these new dimensions of argument as i_f. 
they were not new at all. For example Fisherys "good 
reasons" substitute for "rationality" so that while argument 
styles ma\y change, the processing of argument remains 
conceptually static. The flaw in this way of thinking is 
that Fisher, Kauffmam, and others imply that argument 
content may not • be separated easily from argument
processing. If arguments can be made irrationally, perhaps
they can be processed .i rrational 1 y , in the absence of 
cognitive mediation.
As early as Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (1959) 
researchers recognized an emotional aspect to persuasive 
communication. Yet emotional reactions were thought to be 
mediated upon or by cognitive processes (Izard, Kagan, and 
Za.jonc, 1984). As Zajonc and Markus (1984) note, these 
"c og n i t i ve t heor ies of emot i on" c ons i der "c ogn i t i on as a 
necessary factor (e.g., Lazarus, 1966; Mandler, 1975;
Schachter and Singer, 1962)" (p.75). Affect was not
dismissed as an aspect of persuasion, but it was believed
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t hat emotiona1 r esponse was on e of t he vari abIes t h e 
individual weighed when confronted by persuasive stimuli..
Later researchers sometimes specifically addressed an 
affective dimension to persuasion though usually only as it 
related to cognitive structures. For example Isen, Shalker, 
and Karp (1973) explore affect as it impinges on retrieval 
of material from memory. However some researchers began to 
exp1 or e t he possi b i1i t y t hat c ogn i t i ve and a f fee t i ve 
structures might be distinct aspects of human information 
processing.
Research on Affect
Scientific research on affect has had a spotted 
history. As Campos and Barrett (1984) observed;
Mot long ago (until approximately 1972), emotions 
suffered a not-very-benign neglect by psychologists.
The neglect seemed well justified: Emotions appeared
unamenable to measurement with any degree of 
specificity; . . .
This neglect did not always exist. At one time, the 
consc i ous aspect of emotions, called "affect" or 
"hedonic tone" by theorists like Wundt (1904), 
Titchener (1905), or Beebe-Center (1932), constituted 
one of the three central topics in psychological
theory, along with sensation and association. 
Moreover, in Freud's early theory, affect also played a 
central explanatory role (pp. 229-230).
Thus recent research into the role of affect in persuasion 
represents a return of sorts for some fields.
Lut z Cl 977) i n vest i gat ed c ausal r el at i oris among
cognition, affect, and behavioral intentions,, The
si gn i f .i cance of the Lutz st u d y stems f r om the tonsi deration
of affect conceptually equal to cognition for the study of
per suasion« Moreland and Za.jonc C1-977 ) suggested further
refinement of the affect versus cognition controversy.
Their study presents evidence that stimuli recognition 
C op er at i on a1i z ed as t h e ability to r ec a11 or i dent if y 
previously presented .items) may not be a necessary condition 
for the achievement of exposure effects. Their work on
"mere exposure" effects attempted to find how exposure
functioned if conscious recall of the stimuli was not 
pr esent „ Wilson C1979 > confirmed t he ex .i s bene e o f exposur e 
effects in the absence of cognitive learning possibilities. 
In Wilson's study the subjects could not recall exposure to 
the stimuli. Si mi lari ly Za.jonc (1980) demonstrated
statistically significant differences in subject preferences 
for previously encountered but unrecalled stimuli.
Considered collectively, these studies in psychology and
marketing indicate a growing recognition that affect may be 
an important and perhaps conceptually distinct element of 
the persuasive process.
Zajonc and Mar kus (1984) identified this trend when 
they wrote,
conceptual isolation of affect and cognition is likely 
to persist unless we come to understand which elements 
of these two processes make contact with each other and 
how the influence of one process over the other is
actually effected. . . . The interface, of a f feet and
cognition presents a considerable theoretical and 
experimental challenge because i t i s not c1ear Just how 
and where the affect-cognition interface should best be 
studied (p„ 73').
While the present study does not address all the concerns 
raised by Zajonc and Markus (e. g. physiological mechanisms 
o f information p r o c a s sing ) , it d o e s s e e k t o e x amine f u. r t h e r 
the theoretical challenges in developing a rhetoric of 
affective persuasive appeals.
Purpose of the Study
This study examines the concept of affect as a strategy 
for persuasive communication. Specifically, this study
reviews.research and scholarship in psychology, marketing, 
communication theory, and rhetoric as it relates to 
affective persuasive appeals. The findings of this review 
are then conceptually applied to Cacioppo and Petty's
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (1384a),. This 
model attempts to identify audience conditions in which 
affect may be expected to function persuasively (the model 
is examined in greater detail in chapter two). The purpose 
of this study is to attempt to develop a rhetoric of 
peripheral persuasion based on affect under conditions of 
audience 1 ow-el abor at i on likelihood,, Implicit to this
discussion is the argument that affect-based persuasion
using peripheral cues may involve audience participation 
without increasing elataoration—1ikelihood„ In this sense
affect-based persuasion may be distinguished from 
traditional emotional appeals employed in a cognitively 
based persuasive strategy. Focus on this model is useful 
because it represents an attempt to synthesise various 
approaches to persuasion under one conceptual framework. 
Moreover though the model recognises the possibility of 
noncognitive processing of persuasive cues, it still suffers 
from an over-emphasis on cognitive processing in the study 
of persuasion. This study argues that a more complete 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f per s u a s i o n n e c e s s i. t a t e s c o n c e p t u a 1 i z a t i o n 
of its noncognitive dimensions.
A survey review of work on persuasion across the fields 
of psychology, communication theory, marketing, and rhetoric 
i s necessary for at 1east t wo r easons. Fi r st an
apprecia t .i o n f o r t h e e c 1 e c t i c n a t u r e o f t h e s t u d y o f 
persuasion is enhanced by an historical overview. Second an 
understanding of the need for a rhetoric of affective 
persuasion stems from the realization that current research 
emphasizes the role of cognition in persuasion at the 
expense of affeet.
Psychology and Communication Theory
T he r e1 a t i onship between r es ea r eh i n s oc i a1 ps yc h ology
a n d c ommun i cat i on t heory is an in t imate one. Many of the 
current issues in communication research have their roots in 
psychological studies (Littlejohn, 19731„ For this reason, 
this section will first review relevant studies from 
psychology.
P syc h o1og V and Affect
Hovland, Jain is and Kelley (19591 were among early 
psychologists who recognized the interplay of cognitive and 
affective factors in communication and persuasion. They 
note several elements to persuasive communication, including 
g r oup member sh i p C p „ 271 1 , mot i vat i on and sour c e ef f ec t s
(p.131, individual personality differences (p. 141,
language and h ig her™th oug h t p r ocesses (p „ 991, the roIe o f 
intention (p. 2951, and argument types and organization as 
factors in audience effects (p. 141. Hovland, et al. also
observed that affect-laden messages, such as fear appeals 
(p. 571, may form one dimension of persuasive communication. 
Still, the authors and the research they discuss tended to
place cognition in the forefront of persuasive communication
medi at i on.
Sherif and Hovland (19611, in their study of social 
judgement, recogni zed that many of the cues af f ecting 
attitude formation and change come from the communication of
socially derived norms of behavior:
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The conditions under which social anchors are effective 
in modifying .judgement have implications for the 
process by which individuals internalise categories 
which are social in origin. The greater the st imu1us 
ambiguity or the difficulty of the task, the greater 
the effectiveness of socially provided anchors (p.. 
184) .
In chapter three the ambiguity of communicative stimuli as a 
persuasive strategy will be explored in greater detail.
For now it is important to note that socia 1 anchors rnay 
operate in subtly affective situations. That is, persuasive 
cues may be ambiguous in either cognitively or affectively 
processed dimensions. Sherif and Hovland go on to suggest 
that "Ci.lt is apparent that a great need in linking
.judgement study and investigations of attitude and attitude 
change is intensive research into judgement of affective and 
motivationally relevant material" (p. 203). It is clear
from their discussion that Sherif and Hovland recognised the 
importance of the study of affective stimuli to further our 
understand!ng of communication processes.
Whi1e cognit i ve t heor i es of communi cat ion and 
information processing continue to dominate research in 
psychology (e. g., Simon, 1979), a number of researchers
have begun to focus on affect as a possibly distinct
mechanism for the processing of persuasive communication.
Moreland and Zajonc < 1977, 1979) suggested thsit exposure
effects may be produced without stimulus recognition (in a
10
cognitive sense). Wilson (1979) confirmed this h ypot h esi s, 
observing that exposure effects occur in the absence of 
traditional learning factors as understood in a cognitive 
approach to learning theory, Za.jonc (1980) extended the
study of exposure beyond simple effects to the influence of 
a f fee t i ve .judgement.
In his study Za.jonc found that subjects who could not 
discriminate between old and new stimuli (recognition 
memory) still preferred old to new stimuli when asked to 
make affective judgments. The author suggested that
affective reactions may "precategorize" stimuli, effectively 
increasing information processing rates. While the
physiological implications discussed by Za.jonc are beyond 
the scope of this study, the wide range of possible 
dimensions to the study of affect in persuasion and attitude 
change help .justify an eclectic approach to the development 
a rhetoric of affective persuasion.
The relationship of affect to cognition is the subject 
of an entire volume of studies compiled by Izard, Kagan, and 
Za.jonc (1984). Topics of selected studies include the role 
of emotion in the perception of the self and others (Moore, 
Underwood, and Rosenhan), emotion and attention (Derryberry 
and Rothbart), emotion in socialization (Dienstbier), and 
the interface of affect and cognition in both psychological 
and physiological contexts (Za.jonc and Markus) .
All of the studies reviewed above have .important
implications for the study of persuasive communication. 
However the link to persuasion research is often found in 
th e ext ension of p s yc h o1ogic a1 r esear c h an d research 
methodology by communication theorists.
Communication Theory and Affect
As mentioned above (Littlejohn, 19781, much of the 
research in communication theory has psychological
constructs at its base. Nevertheless many researchers have 
moved beyond simple adoption of psychological topics and
nomenclature for the study of communication to an extension 
and enr i chment of theor .i es of human communicat i on i n t hei r 
own right. Areas of communication research that often 
impinge upon the development of a rhetoric of affective
communication include interpersonal communication (Burgoon 
and Hale, 1984-5 Knapp, 1984), deception research (Cody and 
□'Hair, 1983j Hocking and Leathers, 1980), non-verbal
communication CBurgoon, Duller, Hale, and deTurck, 1984) and 
affective and cognitive manifestations of involvement
(Cegala, 1984).
Each of these areas has a potential contribution to
make to a rhetoric of affective persuasion. Knapp's (1984) 
focus on relational communication in dyads mentioned the 
i mport am: e o f emot i onal expressi on in t he c reat i on and 
maintenance of intimate relationships. Burgoon and Hale
(1984 ) identified the themes o f r eI at i ona1 c ommuni c at i on. 
While not an endorsement of any particular approach, their 
work helps focus further research in -relational 
communication that may apply aspects of affective persuasive 
paradigms.
Work in non-verbal communication may also aid in the 
development of a rhetoric of affective communication. For 
example in their study of relational messages associated
with non-verbal behaviors, Burgoon, Duller, Hale, and 
deTurck (19841 manipulated non-verbal cues such as eye-
contact, proximity, and touch to test their influence on
social meaning. Eye-contact, proximity, and touch can be
manipulated to suggest increased intimacy or the lack of it. 
In either case manipulations of intimacy may suggest
different kinds of topics and arguments appropriate for 
f a cilitating su cc ess f u1 persuasi ve co mmuni c at i on i n a g iven 
si tuat i on.
Hocking and Leathers (1980) attempted to identify
specific kinds of non-verbal cues used as predictors of
lying behavior. Although they were unable to produce 
statistically significant relationships between non-verbal 
behaviors and deception, their research serves as evidence 
that individuals do attempt to validate source credibility 
through means other than an analysis of overt arguments.
Cody and O'Hair's (1983) work with gender as a factor 
in deception and communicator dominance suggested the
possibility that strictly sex differences in audiences may 
generate different affective reactions to persuasion. 
Though their researc h f ocuses on commun.i cat or dorninanc e and 
gender p more subtle manipulations of gender and persuasive 
cues suggest further areas o f considerat ion when exam i n i ng 
the ro1e of affect in persuasion.
C e g a 1 a (1984) r e p o r t e d t h a t p o s .i t i v e a f f e c t i v e s t a t e s 
correlate with higher performance on cognitive tests 
(r ec all). Though the results o f his experi men t wer e mixed f 
the findings confirmed a significant affective component for 
i n t er ac t i on i n vo1vemen t.
In sum the research and scholarship in psychology and 
communication theory suggests a continuing interest in the 
role of affect in persuasive communication. Less certain is 
the relationship of affect to cognition. Studies indicate 
that the cognitive-affective relationship may be 
complementary, hierarchical, mutually interactive, or 
separate processes and/or constructs. In any event it seems 
likely that more speculation regarding the role of affect in 
persuasive communication contexts will be helpful in 
defining the parameters of future research.
Marketing and Affect
Marketing research into consumer behavior and models of
information processing reveals a growing interest in the 
a f fecti ve dimensions o f per suasi ve c omrnun i c at i idn
DeBruic k e r Cl 979) a r g u e d t h a t t he ma.j o r i t y of p u r c h a s e 
b e h a v i o r s occur under 1 o w—involvement c id n d i t i o n s. T h e s e 
behaviors include purchases like snacks and beverages for 
which there exists little product differentiation. Under 
these circumstances, marketers need to be aware of how 
consumers process product information, or at least, how 
purchase decisions are made. Low-involvement conditions
correspond to the 1ow-elaboration likelihood conditions to 
be discussed later. In both cases researchers are
investigating the role of -affect in persuasion.
Ryan and Bon field (1975) review the evolution of the 
Fishbein Extended Model and its application to the study of 
con sum car behavior. As the authors noted, the Fishbein mo deal 
as originally developed is an "extension" of Dulany* s (1968) 
wor k on p r op osi t .i on a 1 c on t r o 1 C c ommunic at i on t heor i st s r e f er 
to the Fishbein model as the behavioral intentions model). 
They observed that the prediction efficacy of the mode-31 is a 
function of three factors: Specificity of intention, time
between measures and behavior, and the degree of individual 
control. Under highly cognitive conditions the Fishbein 
Extended Model can be an accurate predictor of consumer 
behavior. But Ryan and Bon field (1975) recognise that such 
situations do not exhaust the realm of consumer behavior and 
that other independent variables, such as the perceived
15
attitude of significant ot her s t owar d the act, must b e 
e x p 1 o r e d f u r t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d ■ b e 11 e r t h e d :i. m e n s i o n s o f 
c o n 3 u m e r b e h a v i o r »
Lutz (1977), 1985> reported that consumer attitudes may
b e c ompie x, mu11 i1 ayer ed c on str uc t s i n wh i c h a f fec t an d 
cognition play varied roles,, For Lutz, under high- 
involvement conditions), decision making seemed to be a
highly hierarchical process consistent with traditional 
cognitive processing approaches. However Lutz noted
threshold effects are applicable here? cognitive processing 
requires some base level of exposure before becoming 
e f f e c t i v e „ R e g a r d i n g t h e F i s h b e i n m o d e 1 , L u t z s u g g e s t e d
that the attitude toward the act is the only significantly 
explanatory variable. Lutz also recognized that "simple
flow chart models and linear relationships may not
adequately account for the motivation of buyers to process 
information" (p„ 207), Normative components. Lutz
concluded), need greater i n vest i gait i on, Presumably this 
includes 1ow-involvemerrt conditions and perhaps social 
influences as well.
Mitchell and Olson (1981) reported that advertising 
content, operationalized as an independent variable,
produces significant effects on consumers1' beliefs about
p r o d u c t a 11 r i b u t e s „ a c t i tudes, and p urchase in t e n t i o n s ,.
T h e s e f i n d i n g s s u g g e s t s u p p o r t f o r t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t
several factors influence consumer decision making behavior,
16
at least under some circumstances.
Wl-i:L 1 e a 11 these studies r ecogni ce tPie comp3, exi ty of
consumer behavior and underscore the many dimensions of the
persuasive communications that seek to influence it, most of 
these appr oaches still assume a cogni t i ve par ad .i gm for t he 
processing of persuasive communication. Yet when considered 
in light of the s t u d i e s in p s y c h o 1 o g y and c o m m unit: a t i on
theory cited above, it seems apparent that further
exploration into the affective dimensions of advertising 
content and 1ow-involvement situations may be of use to 
researchers of persuasion.
C a cioppo an d Pe11 v ”5 E1 ab or at i on L i k e1ih ood Mod e1
Cacioppo and Petty (1984a3 sought to identify those 
circumstances under which cognitive processing is likely to 
occur and when other means of information processing, such 
as affective response, is likely to be dominant. For the 
authors,
the term e1ab or at i on 1i k e1i h ood refer s t o the 1i ke- 
lihood one engages in issue-relevant thinking with the 
aim of determining the merits of the arguments for a 
position rather than the total amount of thinking per 
se in which one engages (p. 6741.
Issue-relevant thinking is a key phrase here in that the 
engagement of the individual in thinking or not determines
17
the "route" the stimuli will follow as they are processed,, 
These "routes to persuasion" (Caeioppo and Patty,, 
1984aj Petty and Caeioppo, 198Sa) were termed central routes 
for cognitive processing and peripheral routes for affective 
response processing. Consistent with research in psychology, 
communi cat.ion theory, and marketing, the authors attempted 
t o 1 i n k their discuss .i o n o f h .i g h e 1 a b o r at i on 1 i k e 1 i h o o d t o 
traditional approaches of cognitive processing of 
.i n f o r m a t i o n . Essentially, high elabo r a tie n 1 i k e 1 i hi o o d 
situations will motivate individuals to think carefully
about the merits of the arguments for a recommendation. 
Moreover, high elaboration likelihood situations predict 
r elati vely enduring a11 i t ude change when per suasi ve app.ea.1 s 
are successful (Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo,
1987, p . Li'34 ) .
As given the model synthesises a wide range of
persuasion research from psychology and adapts it to a
marketing context. By specifying the conditions in which 
attitude change may be most enduring, Caeioppo and Petty 
provided a conceptual framework for marketing managers. 
Managers may then generate promotional strategies to involve 
consumer attention toward the adoption of a given product. 
Summarizing the development and purpose of the ELM, Petty, 
Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo wrote that
The El abor at i on Li ke 1 .i hood Mode 1 r epresent s an a11 emp t 
to integrate the many seemingly conflicting findings in
IS
the persuasion literature under one conceptual umbrella 
by specifying a finite number of ways in which source 
message, and ot her var i ab 1 es have an i mpac t on a11 :i. t ude 
c han ge ( p „ 233)
The usefulness of such a conceptual framework is almost 
self-evident. By unifying disparate approaches to the study 
of persuasion, the ELM may be useful for extending our 
knowledge of the various influences operating in any given 
persuasive situation. However the model is not without its 
critics.
Stiff (1986) and Stiff and Boster (19871 argued that 
the ELM does not specify which route to information 
pr ocess i ng a g i ven persuasive cue wi11 t ake. They cite t he 
claim of Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo (1987) that 
depending upon the circumstances, the same cue may be 
processed by either central or peripheral routes, or both, 
as an untestable hypothesis (Stiff and Bolster, 1987).
Additionally, Stiff (1986) claimed that a meta-analysis of 
persuasion research in which variables identified by the ELM 
as affecting either central or peripheral routes to 
persuasion does not yield significant results to support the 
model. These two claims form the basis of the current 
controversy over the efficacy of the ELM for explaining how 
persuasive information is processed by the individual.
Although Stiff (1986) and Stiff and Boster (1987) raise 
objections to the ELM, the response of Petty, Kasmer, 
Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo (1987) and Petty, Caeioppo, Kasmer,
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a n d H a u g t v e d t (1 S'S "7) i n d i c -a t a s t h a t t hi e co n t r o v e rs y :i. s 
likely to continue for some time,. Petty et a.l (1987)
maintained that the ELM does indeed make the distinctions 
b et ween c entval and per i pher a1 r out es o f p rocessi ng a gi ven 
cue is likely to follow. The authors further argued that 
St i f ffs (1986) meta—analysi s is met hodo1og i ca11y f1 awed , 
combining st adies t hat are stat i st i ca11y incompat i b1e 
CPetty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo, :L987) „ However, as 
with traditional" approaches to persuasion studies, the 
majority of this dialogue focuses on cognitive or central 
processing routes of persuasion. Little or nothing that 
attempts to explain how peripheral appeals function is 
evident in the literature. The present study exp1 ores how 
rhetorical theory may explain the functioning of peripheral 
persuasive appeals.
Rhetorical Theory and the ELM
A rhetorical approach to the ELM offers a number of 
advantages to the study of persuasion not evident in the 
cur r en t c on troversy. First, r het or ic c an e x am ine t he
heuristic possibilities of the model for the generation of 
theory without concern for arguments about whether or not 
the predictions of the model can be operationalised, 
empirically tested, or quanti tati vely falsified. While such 
approaches are useful for establishing the parameters of a
given theory when applied, it seems clear that the ELM is 
still a theory under development. Before testable
hypotheses may be successfully generated, further 
conceptua1ization of the elements of the ELM are needed.
Second while ELM tenuously unites research from 
psychology, communication theory, and marketing under one 
conceptual framework, little attempt is made to integrate 
work on persuasion found in the field of rhetoric. On the 
one hand this absence is understandable, given the 
scientific, quantitative approach to persuasion undertaken 
in these three fields. On the other hand it seems prudent 
to pursue the study of persuasi on using all the avail ab1e 
resources. Zajonc and Markus C1984) observed that the study 
of affect is still "abstract. „ . and rests entirely on
inf er enc es made f or variat i ons in behavior and t hei r 
relationships to input" (pp. 75-76). With the limits of 
science for the study of affect identified, it seems that 
the growing eclecticism exhibited in the study of persuasion 
invites the conceptualization of the elements of the ELM 
from a rhetorical perspective.
Third' while the majority of attention given to 
persuasion studies focuses on cognitive processing of 
message factors, contemporary rhetorical theory provides a 
conceptual approach for identifying how peripheral routes to 
persuasion may operate. A review of scholarship in rhetoric 
indicates an interest in and need for the explication of the
affective dimensions of persuasive communication.
Rhetorical Theory and the Conceptualization 
of Affect in Persuasion
Historically, rhetoric has focused on cognitive 
processing of arguments in the study of persuasion. However 
the recent development of narrative models of argument 
include affective di mensi ons of per suas.i on CBur ke 1966, 
1969a, 1969b? Conley, 1984? Farrell, 1986? Fisher, .1.980,
1984, 1985a, 1985b? Fisher and Filoy, 1982? and, Frentz,
1985). A brief review of narratives models of argument 
illuminates the usefulness of a rhetorical approach to the 
explication of peripheral routes to persuasion.
Burke Cl966? 1969a, 1969b) offers a widely eclectic
approach to the study of language and its rhetorical 
dimensions across many communicative contexts.
Specifically, his work on persuasion is useful as an aid for 
understanding contemporary rhetorical theory. For Burke 
C1969a, 1969b), persuasion equals identification, the
symbolic merging of one individual's perspective with that 
of another.
Breaking with traditional approaches to persuasion, 
Burke argued that identification may be accomplished through 
a variety of communicative strategies. Most importantly,
Burke posits that some of the most effective persuasive
strategies may be aesthetic ones. Aesthetic appeals
encourage identification through imaginative participation, 
often an affective, not rational, process (1966, pp. 25-43; 
.1.969b, pp. 19-23, 49-58, 78-83, and, 1973, pp. 191-220, 293- 
304). In contrast to the conclusions of Caeioppo and Petty 
(1984a), Burke maintains that successful and lasting
attitude change is possible through affective persuasive 
strategies.
Con lie y (1984) observed that the concept of the
enthymeme, a "reliance on probabilities" (p. 169) is one
area of consensus among contemporary scholars in rhetoric. 
Yet he argues that what constitutes a probability for most 
scholars is less clear. He asserts that Burke (and for that
matter, F'erelman) is a rhetorician whose works have not been
fully integrated into the body of contemporary rhetorical
theory (pp. 180-182). Conley proposes that current
scholarship should attempt this integration and extend the 
discussions of Burke to rhetorical discourse not already
explained by traditional approaches. This extension implies 
a speculative, interactive approach to persuasion that may 
include affective dimension of argument as wholly consistent 
with rhetorical study.
Farrell (1986) noted that even traditional approaches 
to rhetorical or poetical language study must imply the 
possibilities of the other. While not an advocate of an 
artificial distinction between rhetoric and poetics, Farrell
recognizes that even when separated for purposes of study,, 
an un derst and i n g o f bot h eI emen t s i s n ec: assaxr y f or a f u 11 
appreciation of either dimension (p„ 15),,
F .i. s h e r (19 S 4 ) e x plicitly a. d o p t e d a n  a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g m 
for the conceptualization of argument,, Though his
application of narrative seems to reflect an antiquated 
formalistic approach, his work nevertheless underscores a 
realization that the study of rhetoric,, especially in mass 
media contexts, requires a broader conceptual frame than 
t r ad i t i ona1 ap pr oac hes allow„ Whi1e this wor k an d
subsequent elaborations (Fisher , 1985a, 1985b) are
t hem'ise 1 ves eontroversi a 1 Ce„ g. , War ni c k , 1987; Row 1 and ,
1987), few dispute the desired benefits to be gained by a 
broadening of the scope of rhetorical theory beyond simply 
rational argument paradigms,
Frentz (1985) adopted a conversation metaphor for 
r het or i cal t heor y- For Frent z , disc ussants col1 apse
historical arguments into a "temporal holism" of the
present; combining the various perspectives of past 
arguments into the present consciousness of the individual 
(p. 7). Frentz cites the film My Dinner With Andre' as an 
example. In the film, two friends discuss their experiences 
and how they view the world. But as the film progresses,
the viewer notes that the story is not about the characters'
experiences or Andre's adventures. It is a film about how 
the characters talk about the past, how the past remains a
dynamic part of the present through conversational telling 
and retelling.. While such a process may involve a
onsci ous, c ogn i t i ve ac t i vi t y on t hie par t o f t he i nd i vi dua 1
regarding the specific content of the arguments themselves, 
the conversational nar r at i ve .i t se 1 f .i s a r e 1 at i ve.1 y
unconscious act,. As such many affective elements may
prefigure any conscious attempts at synthesis.
Summary
The extension of rhetorical theory beyond consideration 
of strictly rational conceptualization of argument is an 
appropriate response to the increasingly'’ complex nature of 
p er s uasiv e communic a t ion. Yet, as a whole, t h i s process is 
often unwieldy-', threatening to obscure important elements of 
per suasi on i n a r ush t o embr ace ec1ec t i c i sm„
This study seeks a narrower focus. Ely specifically 
concentrating on the rhetoric of peripheral appeals, this 
study pursues two goals. First, it is hoped that a rhetoric 
of peripheral persuasion will increase our understanding of 
t h e ELM an d its role in t h e d eve1 op men t of t h eor i es of 
persuasion. Second, a rhetoric of peripheral appeals may 
contribute to our understanding of the relationship between 
narrati v e a n d a r g u merit.
Outline of the Study
Following this introduction the rest of this study is 
divided into three chapters. Chapter Two' introduces and 
exp1ores the Elaboration Li ke1i hood Model of per suasi on„ In 
addition to a discussion of the Model, this chapter reviews 
the on-going controversy between the Model's originators and 
its critics (Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo, 1987; 
Petty, Caeioppo, Kasmer, and Haugtvedt, 1987; Stiff, 1988; 
and, Stiff and Boster, 19871. Finally, this chapter
discusses the benefits derived from taking a rhetorical 
p e r s p e e t i v e o f 1 o w—e 1 a b o r a t i o n 1 i k e 1 i h o o d p e r s u a s i v e 
appeals.
Chapter Three develops a rhetoric of -affective 
argument,, This chapter presents concepts and d i sc ussi ons 
from contemporary and often eclectic approaches to 
rhetorical theory as the conceptual building blocks of a 
rhetoric of 1ow—elaboration likelihood persuasion.
Chapter Four applies the concepts developed in chapter 
three for the criticism of selected Benson and Hedges print 
advertisements. These advertisements are especially useful 
for this study because of their notable lack of ad copy. 
The "in format i onal" aspect of these per suasive ap p ea1s 
resides in the nondisoursive acts of the persons in the 
photogr aphs. In short these commercial per suas.i ve a11empt s
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are un1ik e1y t o evoke c ogn it i ve f3 ar t i cip ati on as discus3ed 
in the ELM,, This application demonstrates the explanatory 
p o w e r o f a r h e t o r i c o f 1 o w - e 1 a b o r a t i o n 1 i k e 1 i h o o d p e r s u a. s i v e 
appeals,, This chapter concludes with a summary of the study 
and suggest i ons f or f ur ther r esear c h »
CHAPTER TWO
Th i s c h apt er d i sc usses t h e E1 ab or at i on L i k e I i h ood Mod e .1 
(ELM!) of persuasion developed by Petty and Caeioppo (1981,, 
1986fa ) and Cac i oppo and Pe11y (1984a) . In expI or i ng the 
development of the ELM this chapter reviews related works by 
Pe11y and Cacioppo and their associates (pe11y and Caeioppo, 
1979, 1981, 1983, 1984 ; Petty, Cac i op p o, . !<asmer , an d
Haugt vedt, 1987; Pet t y , l<asmer , Haugt ved t, and Caci oppo,
1987; Petty, Caeioppo, and Schumann, 1979), Following this 
exploration of the ELM this chapter identifies criticism of 
the model by Stiff (1986) and Stiff and Boster (1987). 
Finally this chapter argues that a rhetorical perspective 
t owar d t h e ELM p r ov i d es t h eoretie a1 b en e f i t s n o t add r e sse d 
by the discussants in the current controversy.
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion
As indicated in chapter one the ELM "represents an 
attempt to integrate the many seemingly conflicting findings 
in the p e r s u a s .i o n 1 .i t e rat u r e u n d e r o n e c o n c e p t u a 1 u m b r e 11 a " 
(Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo, 1987, p, 233), The 
authors integrate persuasion theories by indicating the 
channels or routes persuasive messages are likely to follow
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when processed by an individual. According to the ELM these 
r outes may be di st i ngui shed as cent r a 1 or per i pher a 1 r out as. 
Which route a given message will follow when processed by 
t h e i n d i v i d u a 1 i s a f u n c t i o n o f i n v o 1 v e m e n t a n d / o r a b i 1 i t y 
to process the message (Caeioppo and Petty, 19S4a; Pe11y and 
Caeioppo, 1979, 1981, 1984a;; Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and
Cacioppo, 1987). 7hus the key e1ements of the ELM are
central and peri pher a1 r out as to per suasi on, i nvo1vement, 
and ability to process messages.
Central Routes to Persuasion
Petty and Caeioppo (19831 argue that "the csntra1 route 
views attitude change as resulting from a diligent 
considerstion of inf o r ma t i on t h at is c ent r a1 to what p eopie 
feel are the true merits of the advocacy" (p. 31. The
nature of centrality is expanded further by Petty, Kasmer, 
Haugtvedt, and Caeioppo (19871 when they write that:
The most effortful procedure for evaluating an 
advocacy involves drawing upon prior experience and
knowledge to scrutinize carefully and elaborate the
issue-relevant arguments in the persuasive
communication along the dimensions that are perceived 
central to the merits of the attitude object.
According to the ELM, attitudes formed or changed via
this central route are postulated to be relatively 
p er s ist en t , pr ed i cti ve o f b eh av ior, and r es i st ant t o 
change until they are challenged by cogent contrary 
information along the dimension or dimensions perceived 
central to the merits of the object (p. 2341.
For the authors the central route to persuasion is 
theoretically consistent with traditional or cognitive 
approaches to persuasion. This "cognitive bias" in the 
study of persuasion was reviewed in chapter one and reflects 
the belief that cognitive activity governs or mediates 
emotional responses to persuasion C i e.. I sen, Shalker, and 
!<arp, 1973; Izard, Kagan , and 2a.jon c , 19S4) „ For e x: ampl e,
central routes to persuasion are predicted by the ELM when 
an individual said to be highly involved with the subject 
matter of a persuasive message.
E x t e n d i n g t h is e x a m p 1 e b y i 11 u s t r a t i o n , s u p p o s & a 
candidate for political office declares; opposition to 
abortion. Individuals for whom the question of abortion is 
personally involving may take stands for or against the 
politician. The reaction of individuals to the candidacy of 
this hypothetical politician may be highly emotional. Yet 
the ELM predicts that this very involvement will lead to a 
c 1 o s e s c r u tiny of the candid a t e? s attempts a t p e r s u a s .i on. 
Thus the central route to persuasion does not preclude 
emotional involvement. Rather the ELM predicts that under 
high involvement conditions an individual's response to 
attempts at persuasion will follow a cognitive, central 
route when mentally processed.
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Peripheral Routes to Persuasion
In developing their conceptual umbrella Petty -and 
Caeioppo recognized that the central route to persuasion at
best explained only one aspect of persuasive information
processing™ Noting other theoretical approaches to
per suasi on Pe11 y and Cac ioppo C19G3) post ulate '1 a mor a 
per i pheral r oute to attitude change™ Under this second view 
attitudes change because the attitude object has been 
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h e i t h e r p o s i t i v e o r n e g a t i v e c u e s o r t h e
person uses a simple decision rule to evaluate a
ir ommun i c at i on " (p . 4) .
An example of a decision rule might be "the mors 
arguments the better™" More spec .i f i cal 1 y , in the absence of 
arguments or in instances where products are perceived as 
highly interchangeable (such as in a convenience store) a 
dec i sion ru1e might be "buy the most a11 r acti ve1y pac kaged 
item." In these instances and for a variety of reasons 
either personal or environmental the ELM predicts that the 
individual will not closely scrutinize persuasive messages™
By including a "variety" of reasons in the
determination of the route to persuasion a message will 
follow the ELM expands our understanding of persuasion 
beyond consideration of simply the processing of the message 
itself™ In short, the ELM recognizes that other factors 
such as personality and/or social pressures affect how
r>1
persuasion occurs by influencing the route messages will 
f o 11 o w w h e n p r o c a s s e d b y t h e i n d i v i d u a 1 „ F o r e x a m p 1 e P e 11 y 
and Caeioppo (. 1983) note that "for teenage smokers, who may 
be more concerned with impressing their peers than with 
their health, the major reason why they smoke may relate to 
the image of the particular brand" (p. 22),. In this
instance the teenager may not engage in a scrutiny of issue- 
relevant messages about the particular brand of cigarettes. 
Rather the teenager may not consider identification with an 
image as the reason for smoking at all,. In chapter three 
the implications of this persuasion through identification 
for rhetor i ca1 theory are di scussed i n more detaiI„ The
point here is that use of peripheral routes to persuasion 
are distinguished by an absence of issue-relevant thinking 
on the part of the individual processing the persuasive 
message,, Once again Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, arid Caeioppo 
(1987) explain;
This does not mean that people never form attitudes 
when motivation and/or ability to scrutinize a message 
are low, but rather that attitudes may be changed as a 
result o f r e1 at i ve1y simple associ at i ons C as i n
classical conditioning? Staats Z< Staats, 1958), 
inferences (as in self-perception; Bern, 1972), or
heuristics (Chaiken, 1980, .1987) in these situations.
Attitudes formed or changed via this per i pheral rout e
are postulated to be relatively less persistent,
resistant, and predictive of behavior (p. 234).
11 i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t a h e r a. t h a t w h i 1 e t h e p r e s e n t 
study agrees with Petty et al that several factors
i n f 1 a e n c e t h e r o u t e t o p e r s u a s i o n 1 i !•: e 1 y f o 11 o w e d :i. n 
processing, it differs in the interpretation of what 
periphera1 r outes t o per suasion may mean f or the for mat ion 
of attitudes and their resistance to change,. From the 
passage above a certain ambiguity concerning the role of 
peripheral persuasion is evident. For example the classical 
conditioning model of "relatively simple assoc i at i on s"
denies the complexity of peripheral cues triggering social 
dimensions of group identification and affiliation needs as 
factors in persuasion. Bern's work with sel f--p ere apt i on is 
m ci r e mi si e a ding as the i n f e r e n c e p r o c e s s d e s c r i b e d b y B e m i s 
h y p o t h e s i : e d t o b e a c o g n i t i v e f u n c t i o n A t b e s t t h e
peripheral dimensions of social cues interact with the 
central dimensions of inference in the Bern model.. In this 
sanse the d istincti on between peripher a1 and c entr a1 r outes 
to persuasion is blurred,. Chai ken's work with heuristics 
similarly blends the peripheral and central routes
effectively diluting an understanding of the truly distinct 
persuasive power of peripheral messagesa
In chapter three this study will expand upon the
differences between the interpretation of the persuasive 
power of peripheral cues of fered by Petty et al . and the 
proposition advocated here. Namely this study argues that 
peri pher aI routes t o per suasion as i dentif i ed by t he ELM 
l-iave a d i st i nc t rhet or i c a 1 f unc t i on ., Chapt er thr ee ar gues 
that peripheral routes to persuasion may lead to relat i vely
O O
e n cl a r i n g a t1 i t u d e and / o r b e h a v i o r c h a n g e s m o r s t y pic a 1 o f 
the effective persuasive appeals followed by central r out as. 
The difference advocated here is interpretative. Petty et 
al„ maintain that peripheral routes to persuasion while 
sometimes effective are qualitatively inferior to persuasion 
achieved through central routes. This study accepts the
definition of the combination of situational and personality 
f ac t ors t hat according t o t he ELM const i t ut a message 
processing v i a per i ph era1 rout es. However it i s in the 
consideration of the) theoretical impl i cat ions of peripheral 
persuasion as a viable and potent rhetorical strategy that 
this study suggests an alternative analysis of the ELM may­
be useful., Chapter three argues that peripheral routes o 
persuasion offer a means for avoiding the constraints of 
persuasion via central routes while yet providing the 
opportunity for relatively enduring attitude change,.
From the preceding discussion it should be clear that 
what consti tutes a cue f or central or peri pher a1 processi ng 
o f persuasi ve message i s derived f r om t Ine i nt erac t i on o f t Ine 
message with the individual doing the processing. As Petty* 
Kasmer* Haugtvedt* and Caeioppo go on to state that the 
difference between whether a message is processed via a 
central or peripheral route does not depend upon the nature 
of the message itself. A given message variable or group of 
var i ab 1 es may be processed by e 11 her a centr a 1 or per i pIner a 1 
r oute;
Variables may serve as persuasive arquments. providing
information as to the central merits of an object or
issue, or they may serve as peripheral cues, allowing 
favorable or unfavorable attitude formation in the
ab sen c e of a d i1i gen t c on s i d er at i on of t he true mer i t s
of the object or issue (p. 234).
In sum, peripheral routes to persuasion are likely to be 
characterized by an absence of issue-relevamt thinking about 
the message. This absence is further generated by the
interaction of message content or form of presentation with 
the situational constraints surrounding the reception of the 
message. These constraints may include external
distractions to processing such as environmental noise or 
brevity in terms of length of exposure to the message. The 
ability or motivation to process the message is also a key 
element in identifying the routes to persuasion a message
w i11 f o11ow when p r oc essed.
Involvement
It is clear from the discussion of the ELM that how a 
particular message is processed is dependent upon the 
interaction of the message and the individual. What might 
constitute a central cue for one person may only be a
peripheral cue for another. Which route is followed in the 
processing of persuasive information is a function of 
involvement or the degree of motivation to process possessed
by the individual.. High issue involvement occurs when an 
issue l-ias "intrinsic importance" or "persona 1 rneani ng '
(. P e 11 y a n d C a c i o p p o, 1979) . L o w i s s u e i n v c 1 v e m e n t i s
predicted whan an issue lacks personal relevance., When
i nvolvement i s h i g h in resp on se to a p ers u as i ve mes sag e tha
m o d e 1 p r e d i c t s a r e 1 a t i v e 1 y h i g h 1 i l< e 1 i h o o d t h a t a n
j. nd i vi dua 1 will engage i n i ssue-r e 1 evant t h .i n k .i ng. UJhen
involvement is low the model suggests that persuasion occurs 
from means other than conscious consideration or elaboration 
of issue-relevant thinking. Thus elaboration likelihood is 
a f un c t i on of in vo1vemen t .
The above description of involvement is consistent with 
the theory of social judgement developed by Sherif and 
Hoviand ClSSl). The key terms of social judgement theory 
a r e la ti t ud es of acc ep tance, r ej ect ion, non c omm i tmen t, an d 
eg o-i nvol vemen t,. Briefly summarising Sheri f and Ho viand the 
latitudes of acceptance or rejection consist of the
psychological distances around certain a11 itudina1 ''anchors"
a person may have regarding some issue. If persuasive 
messages fall within the latitude of acceptanee then the
t heory pr ed i c ts an increased 1ikeli hood of a11 i t ude change. 
The converse is true of the latitude of rejection.
Noncommitment represents another latitude in which the
persuasive message does not evoke a response because the 
i nd i vi dua 1 has no f i r m.1 y hel d a11 i t udi na 1 anc hor r egar di ng 
the subject matter of the message. Sheri f and Hoviand
postulate that attitudes and messages are contrasted by the 
individual processing a persuasive communications
On the basis of studies of social .judgement, we can 
predict that an established attitude provides an anchor 
in appraising a communication pertinent to it.
Communication, particularly persuasive communication, 
may be conceived as another anchor in the judgement 
situation (p. 128).
Ego-involvement represents the degree to which an
attitude affects the self-concept. Presumably high ego- 
involvement may also affect the range of the latitude of 
acceptance or rejection. For example in some cases the 
threat to the self-concept may be so great as to reduce the 
latitude of acceptance to a single point., In such cases 
only persuasive messages that completely agree with the held 
attitude will be accepted and attitude change will be 
impossible. Sherif and Hovland seem to suggest this 
possibility when they note that "the degree of the
individual's personal involvement in an issue should be 
closely related to important characteristics of his
latitudes of acceptance and rejection" (p. 129).
Social judgement theory identifies the importance of 
involvement in the processing of persuasive communication. 
In the context of the ELM social judgement theory supports 
the prediction that high involvement in some aspect of a 
persuasive message will result in a greater likelihood of 
participation in issue-relevant thinking. Under such
conditions messages may be expected to follow central, routes 
to persuasion. Under conditions of low involvement the ELM 
predicts that the individual will not engage in issue­
relevant thinking and that processing of the persuasive 
message will follow a peripheral route.
An example of the role of involvement can be seen in 
two possible responses to the same persuasive stimulus. In 
1986 an advertisement for Magnavox brand television sets 
appeared during prime-time television viewing on the three 
major networks. This ad featured a salesperson asking a 
potential customer, a man, if he could be helped with 
anyt h i ng. The c ust o'mer says "I'm not sur e " and pr oc eeds t o 
describe at a rapid speed the various technical 
specifications he is looking for in a television and remote 
control system. The salesperson nods, listens, and answers 
that the current Magnavox remote control system can handle 
all the functions just described. For the stereo-
knowledgeable viewer this ad could be highly involving 
leading to a careful appraisal of just what each technical 
dimensions of the customer's request suggests in the way of 
performance. Under this set of conditions the ELM predicts 
processing of the persuasive appeal by the central route.
Another viewer of this ad may not be at all familiar 
with the technical specifications of television and stereo 
equipment. Though this viewer may be involved in wanting a 
good product, the technical content of the ad is not
intrinsically involving. However the number of arguments
1 i e. the teehni ca 1 spec i f icat i ons des:i. r sd by the custo«ier ) 
the Magnavox purchase answers may create a positive affect 
response,, Under this set of conditions the ELM predicts 
processing of the persuasive appeal by the peripheral route.
In summary the ELM predicts how the 'role of involvement 
inf 1 '...iences the processi ng of persuasi ve messages in a way 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s o c i a 1 j u d g e m e n t t h e o r y. S h e r i f a n d H o v 1 a n d 
also seem to recognise the potential importance of affect in 
persuasion when they write that "it is apparent that a great 
need i n 1 inking .judgement study and invest igat ion of 
attitude and attitude change is intensive resaarch into the 
judgement of affective and motivationally relevant material" 
Cp„ 203),, It is a premise of this study that part of that
"intensive research" should include a theoretical
exami nat ion of t he a f f ec t v e  dimensi ons o f per suasi ve 
messages under low el aborat i on 1ike1i hood condi ti ons. The
need for investigation into the affective dimensions of 
persuasion stems from criticism of social judgement theory. 
Li 111e.john (1973) observes that social judgement t heory
"assumes, for example, that there is a sequential, causal
mechanism whereby judgement as a cognitive activity precedes 
attitude change" (p. 146)» By extension it seems that the
ELM makes; a similar judgement 5 that cognitive central
processing of persuasive messages is a more potent and 
reliable strategy. Chapter three identifies the rhetorical
conditions that may not only favor processing of persuasive 
messages via peripheral routes but also suggests the 
superiority of affect-based peripheral persuasion over 
cognitive cues for facilitating enduring attitude change,.
Ability of Process Messages
While involvement is the p rima r y det erminant of 
elaboration likelihood the ELM model recognises that other 
f actors may inter vene to prohi bit effective issue-r e1evant 
thinking. These factors comprise an individualfs ability to 
respond and include elements like external distractions of 
noise or exposure to the message and internal distractions 
such as innate cognitive ability and other cognitive agenda.
In the previous Magnavox examp.1 e ext er na 1 di stract i ons 
might include leaving the immediate vicinity of the 
television during the duration of the commercial thus 
limiting exposure. Other external distractions may be found 
in conversations with others present during the duration of 
the ad Inter nal di str ac t i ons may i nc 1 ude daydr eami ng ,
preoccupation with previously presented ads or television 
shows, or anticipation of other matters to be addressed once 
the ad is over. Combined with involvement, this ability to 
p r o c e s s m ay inf1uence w h i c h r o ut e to p e r suas ion a mes s ag e 
f o 11 ows. As Petty an d Cac i op p o (. 1 '384a ') n o t e s
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If people are unmotivated or are unable to think about 
the message j. arid no other sal ient cues are avai lable,
t hi e y rn i g h t i n v o k e the simple b u t r e a s o n a b 1 e cl e c i s i o n
rulej, "the more arguments the better," and their 
attitudes might change in the absence of thinking about 
or scrut inising the arguments,, Accordingly,
persuasion may' require only that people realise that 
t h e me s s a g e co n t ains re .1 a t i v e 1 y f e w o r r e 1 a t i v e 1 y rn a n y 
arguments" (p. 70).
As discussed earlier the decision rule may serve as a
substitute for cognitive processing of persuasive appeals. 
In some instances the use of decision rules may be the
product of previous cognitive effort. For example if after 
careful consideration a person decides all products are the 
s a m e t hen t h e d e c i s i on rule "b uy the most a11 rac t i ve' may b e 
approprlately the result of cognitive processes,. In such 
instances the link between cognition and affect is 
con fi rmed.
In other instances the use of a decision rule may/ be 
more intuitive. For example if a person lacks a certain 
degree of cognitive resources s/he may have learned through 
trial and error similar to classical conditioning that the 
best decision is often accompanied by the most arguments. 
It is possible that the individual may be unconscious of 
this learning or may even avoid conscious recognition of his 
or her "lack" or "stupidity" for psychological reasons. 
Under such circumstances the ability to process may very/ 
well predict that a persuasive appeal will be processed via 
t h e p e r i p h e r a 1 r o u t e.
In sum the key features of the ELM are central routes
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and ability to process messages in any given context as
factors influencing the processing of persuasive
information,, Figure 1 provides a schematic of the ELM as
discussed by Petty and Cacioppo C1933) and Petty, Kasmar, 
Haugtvedt„ and Cacioppo C1987). The left-hand side of the 
model indicates that persuasive messages are influenced .by 
t w o f a c t o r ss Cl ) m o t i v a t i o n t o p r o c e s s C i n v o 1 v e m e n t) a n d , 
C2> ability to process. Before a message can be predicted 
to follow either a central or peripheral route, both of 
these factors must be considered,, It is important to note 
that all messages have elements that may be processed by 
either route. Whether or not any given element of a
persuasive message is processed by either the central or 
p e r i p h e r a 1 r o u t a d e p e n d s u p o n the i n d i v .i d u a 1 ? s i n v o 1 v e m e n t 
a n d a b i I i t y t o p r o c e s s»
As was noted in chapter one the ELM is primarily a 
cognitive model of persuasion. In so far as the ELM
attempts to explain persuasion by means other than cognitive 
processing it is an extension of earlier approaches to 
persuasion, However the right-hand side of the model
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indicates that persuasion via the peripheral route is more 
ephemeral than persuasion achieved through the central
route. It is here that the diagram reflects the bias of
the ELM toward cognitive processing of persuasive messages. 
In all the studies undertaken by Petty and Cacioppo and 
their associates ci. ted above manipu 1 ated independent 
variables addressed cognitive message cues. None of the 
studies attempted to manipulate or measure the effectiveness 
of peripheral persuasive messages. In addition to
dismissing discussion of peripheral persuasion to 
hypothetical examples that confirm the prediction of the 
model the ELM does not encourage speculation on how central 
and peripheral cues may interact. While the diagram does 
chart possible redirection of processing and attention to 
different message cues little exploration of the interaction 
between central and peripheral cue processing is evident in 
the model.
One response to the lack of experimental data on 
peripheral persuasion involves setting up studies designed 
to measure responses to peripheral cues. Pretesting of 
subjects to determine levels of involvement concerning 
various issues may identify subject—groups for whom a
selected persuasive message will be peripherally processed. 
Use of Chi-square analysis to determine simple differences 
of attitudes between a control and an experimental group 
would be feaisible. Even more sophisticated tests such as
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the t-test or ANQVA's could be employed to discriminate the 
effects of peripheral persuasive messages, if any, in a 
given experimental situation.
But the present study argues that plans for 
experimentation would be premature. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter the ELM does not sufficiently describe the 
parameters of peripheral persuasion to warrant experimental 
study. As identified in the studies by Hovland, Janis, and 
Kelley (1953), Isard (1977), Izard, Kagan, and Zajonc (1984) 
and Sherif and Hovland (1961) theorizing about the role of 
affect in persuasion has been incomplete. It seems prudent 
to suggest that a theory of the role of affect in persuasion 
would help point out where scientific experimentation is 
possible. Chapter three attempts to construct a theory of 
affective persuasion that must precede experimentation. 
Moreover other objections to the ELM suggest that re­
consideration of the theoretical tenets of the model are in 
order.
Objections to the ELM
Despite the apparent utility of the model and its 
continued development over several years (Cacioppo and 
Petty, 1984a, 1984b; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, 1983, 1984a,
1984b, 1986a, 1986b; Petty, Cacioppo, Kasmer, and Haugtvedt,
1987; and, Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Cacioppo, 1987)
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consideration of persuasive information processing as either 
a central or peripheral mental process has generated 
eontroversy. Specifically Stiff C1386) and St i f f and Boster 
C1987) have argued that the ELM does not account for or 
predict behavi or as i t s suppor t ers c 1 a.i m.
St i f f (19S6) identiti.es c en t r a 1 r ou.t es as r eq u i r i n g 
tl-iat ■ i ndi viduals "exe r t consider ab 1 e cogn i t i ve ef fort I when 1 
evaluating the message's arguments and assessing the extent 
to which they support the claim of the message" (p. 75),. 
Peri p her a1 r out es, acc or ding t o Stiff, r e quire "re 1 a t i ve 1 y 
little cognitive effort" to process information and "rely on 
non—content cues to make judgments about message 
r ec ommendat i ons" (p„ 7S)„
Stiff recognizes that in s o m e cir c li m s tan c e s i n d i v i d u a 1 s 
will pr ocess per suasi ve messages in ways descri bed by the 
ELM C198S, p. 75).. Nevertheless he asserts several
objections to the model. Fi r s t Stiff be 1 .i eves the mode 1 
insists that "recipients of a persuasive message must decide 
which set of cues Ci. e. central or peripheral! they will 
focus on when processing it" Cp. 76). Second Stiff claims 
that "Petty and Cacioppo fail to assess directly the 
cognitive processes themselves" (p. 77) relying instead on 
reports on attitudes measured by subject responses on 
semant i c di f f er ent i a 1 sca 1 es. Thi r d 31 i f f ar gues t hat Petty 
and Cacioppo "offer no data showing that low involvement 
message recipients process more peripheral information than
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h i gh-i nvol vement recipients" (p 77 '),, Stiff conducts meta­
analyses of the studies cited by Petty and Cacioppo and
concludes that there is insufficient evidence to support the
c1 aims of the ELM. For Stiff (19861s
The meta—analytic procedures used in the present study 
are discussed by Hunter et al. (1982),, Essential ly,
these procedures involve the estimation of effect sices 
between variables of interest for each individual 
study. Once all of the relevant effect sizes are
identified, they are cumulated into a set of summary 
statistics describing the entire body of research.
The effect size statistic selected for use in the 
present study was the correlation coefficient. Its use 
permits identification of possible sources of variance 
in the estimate of average r_„ Hunter et al » (198:2)
discuss techniques for separating the variance in r. due 
to statistical artifacts —  i. e. sampling error, 
measurement ar r or, restri ct i on i n range —  frcm
variance in r. due to unknown determinants. Once these 
statistical arti facts have been identified, the 
estimate of the true variance in r. provides an estimate 
of the stability of the estimated effect size (p. 82).
Essentially Stiff argues that on the basis of his meta- 
analyses the ELM d oes n ot ac c ur a t eIy p r ed i ct h ow p e rsuasive 
messages will be processed (p. 87). He offers instead
Kahneman’s (1973) elastic capacity model as a more accurate 
descr .i p t or o f persuasi ve c ue pr ocessing.
Stiff f a v o r s the l< ahnem a n mode I because i t p r e d i c t s 
"where individuals engage in parallel Hi. e. simultaneous 
processing of more than one item of information)! processing 
and are influenced by both central and peripheral persuasive 
c ues" (p. 79). As St if f describ es it, th e Kah n eman mode1
"suggests that humans are multi-channel limited capacity 
processors capable of parallel processing" (p. 78). Stiff
argues that t he hypot h s i  z ed alloc at i on o f pr oc essing 
c apac i t y t o t he d emands o f bot h c. ent r a 1 and per :i. ph er a 1 c ues 
b e 11 e r e x p 1 a i n s h u m a n c o g n .i t i v e a c t i v i t y t h a n d o e s t h e E L M . 
St i f f f avor s the 1i mi t ed capacity mode1 because he believes 
the ELM assumes the serial or sequential processing of 
i n f o rmation. Moreover St i f f asser t s t hat p er s uas i ve
messages may be processed both by central and peripheral 
routes simultaneously Cp„ 77). He suggests that the ELM 
denies the possibility of simultaneous processing of 
messages by central and peripheral routes C p 76) „ Stiff 
also asserts that the measurement of pupil dilation used in 
the Kahneman model as an indicator of cognitive effort mors 
directly indicates the presence or absence of central versus 
peripheral processing than the measures- used in studies 
supporting the ELM Cp. 78)„ Stiff offers study by Kahneman,
F'aavler , and 0nuska C 1968) in which task di f f icu 11y
correlated with pupil dilation as evidence that pupil
dilation directly measures involvement Cp. 78). However 
Stiff does not demonstrate that task. difficulty and
involvement are correlated and later argues that indirect
assessment of his hypotheses regarding central and 
peripheral processing is acceptable Cp. 81). The point of 
this overview is not to refute Stiff or the criticisms he
offers of the ELM,. Rather the present study seeks to
identify points on which operationalization of the ELM and 
f or that ma11 er t he st ucly o f per suasion su f f er from
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d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r the o r e t i c a 1 i s s u e s s u c h a s w h a t
c o n s t i t u tes in v o 1 v erne n t.
The merits of the Kahneman model lie in its suggest i on 
that individuals may process information hoiistically and 
the recognition that there is likely some finite limit to
any p e r s o n ' s p r o c e s s .i n g c a p a c i t y . Th e s e s t r e n g t h s d o o f f e r
some interesting avenues for researchers. For exampie
semioticans studying intercultural differences in cognitive 
processing may wish to investigate whether serial or 
parallel processing is an inherent function of language.. 
The differences in essentially syntactic languages like 
English and essentially pictographic languages like Japanese 
may "train" their users in serial or parallel processing 
respectively. If such differences exist then the Kahneman
model may be a more universally applicable information 
processing model than the ELM. Other tests perhaps from the 
field of physiologi ca1 psychology may offar more pr ec i se 
determination of the usefulness of either mode1 to predi c t 
how persuasive information is processed.
Focus on a limited capacity model may also encourage 
researchers to. attempt identification of the upper and lower 
1 .i mi t s o f c ogn i t i ve ac t i vi t y. Resear c h .i n t h .i s ar ea will 
likely merge physiological psychology with concerns in 
education for how to utilise best an individual's capacity 
t o f a ciIi t at e lea r ni n g.
These hypothetical examples of the implications of the
Kahneman model support its usefulness as a heuristic 
research tool,, Nevertheless the Kahneman model in and of 
itself does not invalidate the ELM,. The predictions of the 
E!._ M m a y s t i 11 b e o f s u b s t a n t i a 1 u s e i n a p p r o p r i a t e
persuasive contexts™ In fact comparison of the ELM and the
Kahneman model may remind researchers to identify the domain 
of a given theory more carefully without necessarily 
i n v a 1 i d a t .i n g e i t h e r m o d e 1 »
Mor eover Pe11 y, Kasmer, Haugt vedt , and Caci op p o (1987) 
specifically contest the criticisms of the ELM identified by 
S t i f i; ™ A s n o ted in c h a p t e r o n e t h e a u t h o r s r e. j e c t 31 i f f' s 
meta-analysis as methodol oqi cal 1 y flawed;;
The techn i que o f meta•-ana 1 ysi s wor ks best when
averages can be taken across a very 1 arge number of
studies employing different subjects, topics, and 
man i pu 1 at i ons. Whien an est i ma be i s based upon on 1 y t wo 
or three data points, as in Sti f f,s analysis of 
credibi1ity, the effects observed may be too dependent 
on faictors other than the variable of interest that can 
have an impact on the effect size,, When averaging 
across many studies, these extraneous variables may be 
less problematic since they are more likely to be
randomly distributed across the conditions of interest., 
It is important to note that Stiff recognized that his 
analysis included only a "minute portion of the total 
credibility literature" Cp™ 35), and he concluded that 
a "more comprehensive analysis of the effects of
invcl vement on t he sour c e c r ed i b i 1 .i t y—a11 i t ude
relationship would be more enlightening" Cp™ S3)™ On
this point, we agree CPetty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and
C a c i o p p o, 1937, p. 244)™
Besides faulting Stiff's lack of familiarity with 
i nvci 1 vement 1 i ter at lar e Pet ty, Cac i oppo, l<asmer , and 
Hauqt ved t C1937) ar g ue t h at S t i ff an d Bost er's use of fi ve
50
graduate students to assess likely involvement of
undergraduates on issues relevant to persuasive messagess
Stiff and Bos ter argue that it .is better to have 5 
graduate students make ratings of.involvement than 28 
undergr aduates, A11 hough i t is undoubted1y d i f f i cu11
for any .judge to guess how involved another group of 
people was at another point in time, we believe our 
procedure is more .justifiable than theirs on a number 
of grounds™ First, 28 raters will produce a more 
reliable (less idiosyncratic) judgement than 5 raters,, 
Second, our preference for u n d e r qra d ua te . j udg es i s 
based on the fact that undergraduates were the subjects 
in all of the s tudies c o mpr ising t h e m e t a-an a 1 y s i s., 
Thus, our .judges would be at a similar level of 
psychological development as the subjects in the 
original studies and might better identify with the 
concerns of others is their own age group. . . . In
sum, we believe that there are grounds to prefer our 
rating procedure over that employed be Stiff" (p„ 260).
To summarize briefly Petty et al„ argue that Stiff and 
Boster’s criticism of the ELM is both conceptually and 
methodologically flawed. Moreover they contend that "Stiff 
and Boster continue to misrepresent the ELM and attack 
straw-man positions" (Petty, Cacioppo, Kasmer, and 
Haugtvedt, 1987, p. 262). A close reading of the criticism 
of the ELM offered by Stiff and Stiff and Boster does reveal 
a lack of consistency especially on the issue of involvement 
and how to measure involvement. Petty et al. do appear to 
answer the criticism of their model reasonably if not 
definitively. An apprai sal of the methodological points of 
contention is beyond the scope of the present study. The 
review of the controversy over the ELM is offered for two
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reasons. •
First there is at issue conceptual differences 
regarding how persuasive information is processed that 
w a r r a n t further the o r i z i n g about t In e r o 1 e o f a r g u m e n t s a n d 
s i mp1e c ues in p er suasi on. Second t h e c on t rove r s i a1 n at ur e 
of the methodological arguments surrounding the ELM would 
seem to support the premise of the present study that the 
cleve 1 oprnent of a theory of per suasi 'an de 1 i neat i ng aspects of 
t In e ELM is necessar y b e f o r e m o r e e f f e c t i v e t e s t x n g o f t h e 
model is possible.
In response to the specific objections raised by Stiff,, 
the authors maintain the ELM does specify where and when a 
message is likely to be processed by either the central or 
p e r i p h e r a 1 route. But t In e y r e j e c t t h e i d e a t h a t
individual s c on sc i o u s 1 y d ecide between t In e t w o r o u t e s F  o r 
its originators the ELM describes how persuasive cues are 
p r oc essed , p r ed i c t i ng t h e 1 i k e 1 y p at In a c ue will f o 11 ow 
under a given set o f c o n d i t i o n s. P e 11 y, C a c i o p p o, l< a s m e r , 
and Haugtvedt (1987) maintain that Stiff's interpretation of 
the ELM is too deterministic and static. They argue that,
Stiff continues to misperceive the ELM as a theory- 
postulating "central processing" of "central cues" and 
peripheral processing" of "peripheral cues." Rather, 
the ELM outlines two general "routes" to persuasion. 
The central route is followed when p e op1e are mot i vat e d 
and able to engage in a careful scrutiny of the central
m e r i 'I: s o f an a 11 i t u d e o b j e c t......  T h e per 1 pheral
r oute i s f ollowed when motiva t i on an d/o r ab i1ity to 
evaluate the central merits of a n a11 itud e abj ec t are 
personally low, and attitudes are affected primarily by
s i m p l e  c u e s  i n  th e  p e r  s u a s i c  n e n v  i  r o n  m e n t  Cp. 2 5 S ) .
Petty, Cacioppo, and thei r associates do not respond to 
Stiff’s claim that research supporting the ELM does not 
measure cognitive activity directly,, However, the criticism 
t hat t he model rests on "unchecked assumpt i ons" CSt i ' f, 
1986, p . 77) seems tenuous at best. For example Stiff 
believes the measurement of pupil dilation used to support 
the Elastic Capacity Mod cel C Kahneman, Peavler, and Onuska, 
1968) is a di rec t m e a s u r e o f c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y» !-l o w e v e r i n
both cases Cpupil dilation and semantic differential scaling 
by subjects), the assumption that each method measures 
cognitive activity remains unc hec keel by direct means. Stiff
may prefer pupil dilation as an indicator of cogni ti ve
activity because it does not require sel f•-report from
subjects. But Stiff does not cite any evidence that pupil
c! :i. I -a t ion is indi cat i v e o f c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y „ T hi e
r cel at i onshi p is an inferred one. Stiff’s objections to the 
ELM rest partially on this criticism that the model does not 
directly measure cognitive activity. If this lack of direct 
measure is an important weakness to the ELM then one would 
expect Stiff to include evidence of direct measurement of 
cognitive activity as a strength of the Kahneman model,, In 
this sense both models rest on similarly untested 
assumpti ons.
Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Cacioppo also dispute
St i f f * s claim .that no evi denee ex i sts suppor ting gr eat er 
pvocessing of par iphara1 appaa1 under 1ow invoIvament 
conditions than under high involvement condi t i or. s. Patty, 
Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981} and Petty, Cacioppo, and 
Schumann (1983) both claim greater peripheral processing 
under low involvement conditions. In the latter study the 
a u t l-i o r s f ci u n d t h a t a r g u m e n t q u a 1 i t y i n f 1 u e n c e d p e r s u a s i o n 
under both high and low elaboration likelihood conditions 
(p. 141). Petty, Cacioppo, Kasmer, and Haugtvedt point out
this finding as ignored by Stiff and Stiff and Boster in 
their criticism of the ELM. Petty, Cacioppo, and Goldman 
(1981) seek to identify how personal involvement influences 
the processing of arguments in persuasion. While argument 
quality does not appear to be a factor in persuasion under 
low involvement conditions source expertise does influence 
persuasion under low involvement conditions (p. 847). In
both the cited studies peripheral cues seem more influential 
than argument quality under low involvement conditions. 
Stiff and Stiff and Boster continue to deny these reports.
Stiff and Boster (1937) reply to Petty, Kasmer, 
Haugtvedt, and Cacioppo by refocusing some of the criticism 
of the model onto the schematic diagram used to illustrate 
the model. They argue that;
Although Petty and Cac ioppo (1986) now emphasize t hat 
these two types of processing represent, endpoints on 
t h e e I abor at i on 1 i !••:e 1 i h ood c on t i nuurn, i t i s d i f f i c u 11 
to imagine how this diagram could be used to explain
parallel processing of central and peripheral 
information Cp. 250),,
Though Petty, Cacioppo, Kasmer, and Haugtvedt deny this 
point' examination of the model as presented in figure 1 does 
not readily indicate how parallel processing might occur,, 
At the same time Stiff and Boster do not recognize that the 
continuum claim is at least two years older than they 
indicate (Cacioppo arid Petty, 1984a, p. 673) „ In short both 
sides must yield some point of argument to the other while 
recognizing the need for further debate to resolve this
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Summary of the current controversy
In evaluating the critique of the ELM offered by Stiff 
C1986) and Stiff and Boster (1987) it appears that both 
sides maintain defensible positions. While it is unclear 
h c> w t h e s c h e m a t i c d i a gram o f the ELM a c c o u nts for p a r a 11 e 1 
p r oc essing the model's op p one n t s f a i1 t o d emon s tra t e 
substantial proof of their other objections. The model's 
supporters also dispute the methodological validity of 
Stiff's analysis of the model., As mentioned in chapter one 
t h i s c o n t r o v e r s i a 1 e x c h a n g e is 1 .i k e 1 y t o c o n t i n u e.
Though the current study recognizes the controversial 
nature of the ELM it :i.s not concerned with resolving the 
issues raised bv Stiff (1986) and Stiff and Boster (1987).
Rather this study focuses on one aspect of the ELM 
over I ooked by both i ts cr i t i cs and supporters,, 3peci f ica 11 y 
neither side considers the affective dimensions of 
persuasion under low involvement, low elaboration likelihood 
condi t i o n s « Given the r ecogni zed bi as of cur r ent r esear ch 
t owar d c og n it i ve processing it seems us e f u1 to at t emp t t o 
frame the t h e o r e t i c a 1 p a r a m e t e r s o f a f f e c t ■- b a s e d low 
elaboration likelihood persuasion. A number of reasons
support a theoretical exploration of affect--based persuasion 
under low elaboration likelihood conditions.
First Petty and Cacioppo C1984a) note that there are 
dimensions to peripheral cues that are based on affect— 
g o v e r n e d c o n d i t i o n s;
Although previous research on peripheral cues has 
focused on how attributes of the message source Ce» g„, 
expertise, attractiveness) can induce persuasion 
without issue-relevant thinking when people are either 
relatively unmotivated or unable to think about issue- 
relevant arguments, the present- research provides an 
initial indication that features of the persuasive 
message may also serve as peripheral cues. Thus, in 
addition to the number of arguments, message factors. „
. . the overall persuasion context Ce.g., the presence
of pleasant surroundings). . . . may Calsol lead people
to infer that they like or don't like the advocacy or 
that it is or is not worth supporting Cp. 78).
Though Petty and Cacioppo do not extend their discussion of 
affect-based persuasion beyond "pleasant surroundings" they 
do recognize that peripheral cues include affect-based 
stimuli. Similarly Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann Cl983) 
assert that "a person may accept an advocacy simply because
5&
it was presented during a pie a s a n t 1 u n c h " ( p . 135)..
Second while the ELM predicts that attitude change 
resulting from per iph ar a1 routes may b e lass r asi stant to 
change it does recognize that in some situations peripheral 
appeals may constitute an effective persuasive strategy.. 
Petty and Cacioppo (1383) argue that.".
The basic tenet of the ELM is that different methods of 
inducing persuasion may work best, depending upon 
whet har the el aborati on 1 i ka.1 i hood o f t he c ommun i c at i on 
situation (that is, the probability of message or 
issue-relevant thought occurring) is high or low. When 
elaboration like 1 .i h o o d is h i g h, t hi e c e n t r a .1 r o u t a to 
persuasion should be particularly effective, but when 
the a1 aborati on 1i ke1i hood is low, the per i phera1 r outa 
should b e b e 11 e r C fD p ■ 4 - 5) .
When the conditions under wh i ch par i pher a1 routes t o 
persuasion may be more effective are combined with other 
influences such as social factors the aff ect i ve dimansions 
of peripheral appeals become clearer. Chapter three
examines the theoretical basis for affeet-based persuasive 
appeals from a rhetorical perspective.
Third this study seeks to demonstrate that affect-based 
peripheral appeals may constitute an important and 
previously neglected aspect of persuasion study. This goal 
is consistent with Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann’s (1983) 
observation that "future work could be aimed at uncovering 
the various moderators of the route to persuasion and 
tracking the various consequents of the two different
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r outes" Cp. 144) . A1 so as Pet1y and Cac i oppo (. 1983) note 
"that attitudes do not always change in a thoughtful manner" 
Cp. 4), the importance of identifying and conceptualizing 
the role of affect in persuasion is heightened,, While the 
ELM does suggest that affect (in the form of classical 
conditioning of response) may influence) persuasion under 
peripheral conditions the model explicitly predicts that 
persuasion by affect will be less resistant to change and 
c oun t er ~ar g umen t at i on t h an p er suasi on v i a t h e c en t r a 1 r out e 
(Petty, Cacioppo, Kasmer, and Haugtvedt, p., 259). In
chapter three this premise .is challenged. In short the
present study argues that there are situations in which 
peripheral message cues may facilitate long-term attitude 
change,,
Finally, as noted in chapter one, the study of 
persuasion is historically grounded in the field of 
r hetor i c. Yet the current controver sy over the ELM ignores
the contributions to the study of persuasion made from areas 
outside the social sciences. Additionally recent trends in 
r h e t o r i c a 1 t h e o r y t h a t a d o p t a n a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g m f o r t h e 
study of argument explicitly include an affect-based 
dimension to persuasion. In light of these reasons it seems 
both prudent and .justified that the theoretical examination 
of th e a f f ec t ive d imen s ion s of 1 ow e1 ab or ation 1 ike1i hood 
persuasive appeals adopt a rhetorical perspective,,
CHAPTER THREE
Though the relationship between rhetoric and emotions 
may be traced at least as far back as Aristotle's Rhetor i c 
and Poetics (e. g. Hershey, 1986; Weiss* 1982) the recent 
wor k of Fi sher ( 1984, 1985a, 1985b ) indi c at es a new .i n t er est
on the part of scholars for the study of rhetorical and 
aesthetic uses of language. Fisher's assertion that human 
b e i n g s be c on s .i d er ed p ar ad i g mat i c a 11 y as homo narrans, or 
story-telling animals lias generated considerable controversy 
Ce. g. Rowland, .1.987; Warnick, 1987). Nevertheless several 
scholars have been quick to embrace Fisher's model of human 
Communication with its expanded view of how rhetoric 
functions (Condit, 1987a, 1987b; Farrell, 1985, 1986;
Frants, 1985). This chapter acknowledges that Fisher's 
model helps place the study of affect in contemporary 
rhetorical theory. However it is also the case that the 
earlier work of Kenneth Burke (1969b) links the application 
o f i" h e t o r i c t o a e s t h e t i c w o r k s a s w e 1 1 a n d b y i m p 1 i c a t i o n t o 
emotional appeals. The purpose of this chapter is to review
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how these two recent developments in contemporary rhetorical 
theory provide a theoretical framework for the construction 
of a rhetoric of affect-based low elaboration likelihood 
persuasion„
T h e Narra t i v e P a r a d i q m a n d R h e t or i_c a 1 Theory
Fisher (1984) first pr oposed t he nar r at i ve parad .igm t o 
offer a t heor et i ca1 and concept ua1 f r amework f or 
un der st and i n g p ub .1 i c mor a 1 ar gumen t s. I n t r i g ued b y t h e
recognition that aesthetic works of art such as dramatic 
product i ons ar.d nove 1 s advocate a perspect i ve on human 
behavior or values (Fisher and Filoy, 1982) , Fisher 
considers that persuasion exists in a number of 
communicative contexts not traditiona11y addressed as
ilr h e t o r i c a 1 » " For F .i s h e r ;
The narrative paradigm, then, can be considered a 
dialectical synthesis of two traditional strands in the 
history of rhetorics the argumentative, persuasive
theme and the literary, aesthetic theme. As will be 
seen, the narrative paradigm insists that human 
communication should be viewed as historical as well as 
situational, as stories competing with other stories 
constituted by good reasons, as being rational when 
they satisfy the demands of narrative probability and 
narrative fidelity, and as inevitably moral
inducements. . „ . The narrative paradigm does not deny
reason and rationality; it reconstitutes them, making 
them amenable to all forms of human communication 
(1984, p. 2).
Fish ter posits a number of terms in his narrative paradigm 
that require explanation. Specifically the terms narrative
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probability and narrative fidelity necessitate further 
di scussion Fisher defines narrative pr obabi I i t y as an 
"inherent awareness of . . - what constitutes a coherent
story" Cp,. 8). For Fisher individual s organise the 
phenomenal world of experience into cohesive stories that 
provide structure and order to an other'wise chaotic 'world., 
Narrative fidelity is an extension of narrative probability 
whereby individuals constantly compare "whether the stories 
the y e x perience r i n g t r ue w i t h t he s t ories t h ey k n ow t o be 
true in their lives" Cp„ 8)..
Fisher’s definition of narrative probability and 
narrative fidelity are part of five presuppositions that 
structure the narrative paradigm Cp,. 7) „ Briefly summarised 
the presuppositions posit that; Cl) humans are storytellers; 
(2) decision—making occurs through the recognition of "’good 
r e a s o n s ’ whi c h var y i n  f orm a mo n g c om mun i ca t i o n sit uat i on s , 
genres, and media" Cp„ 7); (3) good re arsons are in turn
determined by an on—going process of dynamic social 
exchange; (4) rationality is defined by stories which
adhere to the tenets o f narr at i ve pr obab.i 1 i ty and nar r at i ve 
fidelity; and, C5) the world of human existence requires a 
choice among competing stories "in a process of continual 
r ec r- eat i on " C p . 8) .
Fisher basically favors adoption of the narrative 
paradigm for assessing human communication processes because 
he believes narratives are "moral constructs" Cp- 10),.
S 1
Narratives embody mor a1ity v e f 1ecting as Ar i sto11e be1ieved 
that people "have a natural tendency to prefer the true and 
the just " Cp . 9) . Because nar r at i ves embody the hi st or i ca 1 
and social dimensions of group as well as individual 
experience Fisher argues that narratives favor "what works" 
or "rings true" which for him is inevitably morally sound. 
For Fisher this characteristic of narrative has an important 
advantage over other theoretical perspectives for what he 
calls "public moral argument" Cp. 11).
By "public moral argument" Fisher refers to any ongoing 
contr ove r sia1 i s sue d eb a t ed by p eopie in a f ree soc i e t y„ He 
uses the example of debate over nuclear arms to illustrate 
the differen ce between th e narrati ve paradig m and t he 
rational world paradigm.
The rational wor1d paradigm constitutes the application 
of logic and expert testimony to rhetorical situations 
requiring human-dee i si on making. Fisher traces the
development of this paradigm (1984, 1985b) at some length
and concludes that its proponents are "purveyors of
ideological, bureaucratic, or technical arguments. Such 
arguments may overlap, be used by the same arguer, but each 
is distinguished by a particular privileged position;; 
poli t ical ’truth,” administrative sanction, or subject 
matter expertise" C1984, p. 11).
W h i 1 e F i s h e r d o e s n o t d e n i g r a t e t h e a f f e c t i v e n e s s o f 
the rational paradigm for ef feetive dec i si on-maki ng he
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believes that its usefulness' is limited in some
c i rc uinstances. In the cass of t he nuc laar contr oversy
Fisher maintains that the ability of an individual to judge
the merits of technical arguments or indeed asse
competency of the experts themselves is impossible;:
Here is revealed the fate of non-experts who would 
argue about nuclear warfare,, Only experts can argue 
with experts and their arguments —  while public—  
cannot be rationally questioned,, „ . „ In the audience
of experts, the public is left with no compelling 
reason, from the perspective of the rational world 
paradigm, to believe one over the other,, One is not a 
judge but a spectator who must choose between actors. 
From the narrative paradigm view, the experts are
s t o r y t e 11 e r s a n d t h e a u d i e n c e i s n o t a g r o u p o f
observers but are active participants in the meaning~
meet on common ground, given the narrat i ve paradigm,,
Fr cm t he nar r at i ve per spec t i ve, the pr oper r o1e o f
the e x p er t in p ublie mor a1 argumen t i s t ha t o f
counselor, which is, as Benjamin (1963) notes, the true 
■function of the storyteller. His or her contribution
t o pubIic dialogue is t o i mpart knowledge, 1i ke a
expert assurnes t he r o1e o f pub1i c counse1or whenever 
she or he crosses the boundary of technical knowledge 
into the territory of life as it ought to be lived 
1.1984, p „
For Fisher the narrative paradigm provides a 
t h e o r e t i c a 1 p e r s p e c t i v e f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w r h e t o r i c a .1 
processes operate in the realm of public moral argument. 
Uniike the r at i ona1 wor1d paradi gm whi ch denies t he act i ve 
participation of lay persons the narrative paradigm
conceptualises the active involvement of all interested 
parties. Experts may have positions of higher status and 
respect but judgement i s r eserved f or t he c o11ec t i ve who1e
fl o Ljk-j
o f t h (5 a u dience. I n a f f e c t t h e n a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g m m a k e s
experts part of the story itself and one in which all 
p a r t i c i p a t e e q u a 11 y .
This equalising property of narrative is of course the 
ultimate grounding of Fisher's claim that narrative is an 
essentially moral construct. Additionally he favors
a d ci p t i o n o f t h e n a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g m f o r r h e t o r i c a 1 t hi e o r y 
because "narrative as a m o d e o f di sc ou r s e is more universal 
and probably more efficacious than .argument for nontechnical 
forms of communication" Cp„ 14),, Fisher offers three 
r e a s o n s for this cl a i m s
experience of the world, simultaneously appealing to 
the various senses, to reason and emotion, to intellect 
a n d imagination, a n d to fact and v a1ue. 11 d oes n o t
presume i n t e11ec t ua1 contact on1y„ 3econ d, on e does
not have to be taught narrative probability and 
narrative fidelity;: one culturally acquires them
through a universal faculty and experience. .....Third,
narration works by suggestion and identification^ 
argument operates by in f erent i a1 moves and
deliberation. Both forms, however, are modes o f
e x p r e s s i n g g o o d r e a s o n s - -- g i v e n t h e n a r r a t i v e 
paradigm —  so the differences between them are 
s t ruc t ur a1 r at h e r t h a n sub s tan t i v e (pp. 14-15).
Essentially F i s h e r b e 1 i eve s t h e n -a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g m
accounts for human communication that reasons but does not
argue. He distinguishes these functions in a technical 
sense. Argument for Fisher is a logical process that
ut ilises t h e t oo1s o f rh et or i c sue h as sy11og isms, p at ter ns
of deduction and induction), use of evidence from experts, 
and demonstration. Reasoning for Fisher may include these
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el aments but .is. not limited to them. Thus the imaginative 
an d e vocat i ve 1 an guage of 1itar at ur e may a1so per suad e an 
audience. For the present study Fisher's first reason is
the most cogent for it links emotional appeals with
developing rhetorical theory.
In his focus on the social and historical nature of 
narrative Fisher underscores the importance of contact with
0 t h e r s a s a p o t e n t i a 1 s o u r c e o f p a r s u a s i o n „ M o r a o v a r F i s h a r 
r ec ognizes t hat peopie do i n f ac t t e 1.1 st or i es but t hat t he 
nar r at i ve paradi gm ex t encls well beyond disc our se t o ' st and as 
the organising principle of all symbolic .interaction,, The
distinction is that Fisher views narrative as both a mode of
discour se (p . 14> and a par ad i gm f or all human commun :i. c at i on
(p. 3). Fisher (1985b) explicitly extends this latter view 
of nar r at i ve beyond discour ses
It [the narrati ve paradi gm3 envisions exi st :i. ng 
institutions as providing "plots" that are always in 
the process of re-creation rather than as scripts5 it 
stresses that people are full participants in the
making of messages, whether they are agents (authors)
or audience members (co-authors) (p. 8 6 ).
Fisher sees all human activity as organised by narrative 
principles and consistent with his presuppositions for the­
nar rati ve paradigm. While this study argues that much of 
Fisher's work is useful for understanding the role of affect
1 n p e r s u a si 6n i t is necessary to n ot e t h a t th e n arr a t iv e 
p ar ad i g m i s a 1 so cont r over s i a.1 .
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Criticism of the Narrative Paradigm and Implications for the 
Rhetori c of Affect i ve Persuasi on
Though often insightful the narrative paradigm suffers 
from difficulties in i nt er p r et at i on that may prove 
problematic in application to rhetorical c r i t i c i sm„ Rowland 
C. 1987) for example asserts that one problem of the narrative 
par ad i gm i s .i t s scope:
T h e p r o b 1 a m h e r e is that narrativ e has been defined 3  O
- v -n {-4 1 , , -I- L-, n -1- -I- l.-i .-i i J i !...1 <’J. (..j .l y  U * ! <3. w £ t 1 t e r m 1 o ses much of its explanat or y
power. At one level, F i s hi e r i s c .l earIy correct :i. n
labeling his work c>n narrat i ve as a met apar adigm» His
de f i n i t i on o f n ar r at i ve subsumes al1 other forms o f
h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; it i s tautolog i cal1y. true. Yet i f
a 11 f o r rn s o f d i s course are narrative,, it is hard to see
hi o w t h e p a r a d i g m could aid the critic in descri bing or
aval uat i ng a par ticu1 ar work (p. 2£5) ,
Row1 and i s qui t e c orrect that t he narr at i ve parad i gm will be 
o f limit ed pr ac t ica1 value t o the cr i t i c 1ook i ng for some 
method for analyzing rhetorical discourse. If the efficacy 
of the nar rat i ve paradigm were to be found in methodo1oqi ca1 
app1icat i on then the cr i t i c i sm of f er ed by Rowland wou1d 
require that we reject the narrative paradigm as non-method.
But t he va 1 ue o f t he nar r at .i ve par ad i gm i s t heoret i c al 
not practical. Rhetorical theory may benefit from
consideration of narrative as paradigmatic where rhetorical 
criticism may find narrative to be of little practical use.
66
Though Rowland rejects paradigmatic status for narrative he 
belleves that eventually it may offer i mpor tan t
contributions to rhetorical theory;
The conC1 usi ons ola11 i ned above do not under cut t he 
stlady of narr at i ve; i f anything they r e-emphasize i ts 
importance,. Nor do they necessarily deny the value of 
a p p r o a c h i n g h u m a n c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h a m o r e 
developed "narrative paradigm." It is possible that 
F i s h e r and o t h ers could develop na rr at ive as a mo deI 
for understanding communication in a manner similar to 
the way that Burke developed dr amat i sm. Just as Burke 
showed that the dramatistic metaphor could be applied 
to works that were not traditionally consi dered drama, 
it may be possible to develop a narrative approach that 
will inform the study of discourse that does not tell a 
story. The criticism developed here should serve as a 
challenge to encourage further development of such an 
approach (p. 274)„
Gf course t he observat ions offered by RowI and cou1d 
also be disputed. His point that paradigms should provide 
an "approach" to study is ambiguous. That the narrative 
paradigm does not offer a method of -analysis is evident. 
That it may offer a conceptual framework from which to 
"approach" the study of discourse remains unrefuted. It is 
possible then to note the objections to the narrative 
paradigm raised by Rowland on a practical level while still 
endorsing the conceptual implications of the Fisher *s model.
Another problem with the critique offerred by Rowland 
stems from his claim of "discourse that does not tell a 
story" (p „ 274). Fisher c ont ends just the r ever se s Not
only does all d i scourse tell a story but al1 human endeavors 
are in essence "stories" (Fisher, 1985b, pp. 74; 36).
Without specific refutation of this aspect of the; narrative 
p a r a d i g m R o w 1 a n d ’ s c r i t i >:: i s m a p p I i e's o n 1 y t o t h e a f f i c a. c y o f 
the narrative paradigm as a tool for rhetorical oritic ism. 
His rejection of Fisherrs broader claim of narrative as the 
paradigmatic description of human symbolic action rests on 
argument s of insuf f i c i ent scope.
Though restriction to theoretical issues may relieve 
the narrative paradigm of the criticisms; made by Rowland 
other scholars have found difficulty with the narrative 
paradigm at the conceptual level,. For example War nick
(1987) argues that the narrative paradigm does not pass its 
o w n t e s t o f n a r r a t i v e r a t i o n a 1 t y
Because Fisher has .taken equivocal or contradictory
positions on issues that determine how narrative 
rationality is to be used to a s s e s s t e x t s , t hi e
n a r r a t i v e rat i o n a 1 i t y c o n c e p t i n h i s p a r a d i g m i t s e 1 f
lacks narrative probabi1i ty or coherence. First, 
Fisher is unclear about the status of traditional 
rationality in his model. In 1984, he disparaged
tradi ti onal 1ogi o because of its pr esumed tendency t o 
close off discussion and e x c1ud e t h e p ubIi c f r om 
decision-making. In 1985, he reluctantly and
p r o v i s i o n a 11 y r e a d m i 11 e d t r a d i t i o n a 1 r a t i o n a 1 i t y i n t o 
the narrative paradigm without indicating how or when 
it should be necessary in assessing texts tip. 181).
Warnick uses "text" in the same way advocated by Fisher; 
meaning the whole of an on-going process of communicative 
exchange as examp1ed in the pub1i c mora1 argument
surrounding nuclear diearmament„ In addition to a lack of 
coherence Warnick further objects to the narrative paradigm 
bec ause i t relies on ' c onsensus as a crit eri on for .judg ing
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the values in a text" (p., 181), She suggests instead that 
Fisherp s model may be more useful as a "system of critical 
c r i t er i a" •.p« 181) r a 1 her bhan a t heor et i cai par ac< i g11\„
The criticisms of the narrative paradigm offered by 
Warnick more seriously threaten its paradigmatic status than 
those posited by Rowland,, Certainly coherence and
consistency are crucial requirements to any theory,, It is 
possible to separate the narrative paradigm from its 
criticism on this issue by noting that Warnick finds 
inconsistency in Fisher’s defense of the narrative paradigm,, 
W In i 1 e i t i s t r u e t h a t F i s h e r d o e s r e 1 u c t a n 11 y i n c 1 u d e 
traditional rationality in his later article fin this study
m
t In e begin n i n g t In a t t h e n a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g in d o e s n o t re p 1 a c e 
t r ad i t i ona 1 r at i ona.1 i t y blat subsumes i t CFi sIner , 1S84 p „ 3) .
Moreover Warnick seems to want to share some of 
Fi sIner ’ s assumpt ion about publ ic mora 1 ar gument wi tInout 
adequately rejecting Inis conclusions. For example Warnick
r e j ec t s " c on sen sus " as a c r i t i c a 1 c r i t er i on win .i 1 e 
e s sentially accepting the a r g u m e rn t m a d e b y F i s In e r t h a t 
public moral argument may be defined at least partially by 
an i nab i 1 i ty to re 1 y on the author ity of experts to make 
policy C i „ e„ moral) decision. If all participants are to 
b e i n v o 1 v e d i n t h e r e s o 1 la t i o n o f p u b 1 i e m o r a 1 a r g u m e n t t h e n 
on what basis is consensus an inadequate criterion? Warnick 
further obfuscates Fisher’s direct address on morality by
regulating the n a r r a t i v e  pa r a d i g m  to the role of "a system 
of critical criteria" (p„ 181). Again the critic may wonder 
who d e t e r m i n e s  tIne app 1 icat i on of this s y s t e m ?
While Warnick r ai ses qaest ions about ths a p p 1 icat ion 
a n d evaluation of t h e n a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g rn s h e d oes no t 
cl e a r l y  indicate an a l t e r n a t i v e  system of analysis to amend 
the short com in g s s h e b e 1 i e v e s e x i s t in F i s h e r ’ s w o r k . T hi i s 
ab s e n c e  of a c o n s t r u c t i v e  approach to Fis h e r ' s  work 
s e riously limits the sc ope of her own essay.
In sum i t is c 1 ear that the narrat i ve par a d i g m  as 
developed by F.i sher exp a n d s  t he par amet er s o f r het or ical 
t h e o r y t o i n c 1 u d e a 11 a s p e c t s o f h u m a n c o m m la n i c a t i o n „ 
Fisher s p e c i f i c a l l y  e m p h a s i s e s  aesthetic and emotional 
e l e m e n t s  of c o m m u n i c a t i o n  as p o s s essing an -appeal to 
'1 r eason i ng " t hat he d i st i ngui shes f r om ar g lam e n t R o w l a n d  
(1987) and Warnick (1987) vo ice o b j e c t i o n s  to aspects of the 
n a r r a t i v e p a radigm p roposed by F i sh e r . Ro w 1 an d is c on c erned 
with practical a p p l i c a t i o n  and ri g h t l y  points out the 
l i m i tations of the n a r r a t i v e  p a r a d i g m  for use as a method 
for rhetorical criticism. Warnick att a c k s  the internal
c o n s i s t e n c y  of the a r g u m e n t s  Fisher use s to advocate the 
model. Her o b j e c t i o n s  warrant con s i d e r a t i o n  though it is 
u n c 1 e a r a t t h i s p o .i n t whether t h e n a r r a t i v e p a r a d i g m s u f f e r s 
the same 1 ack of c onsist ency she i dent i f i es i n Fi sher rs 
arguments. The lack of a prop os cad a l t e r n a t i v e  to those 
s h o r t c o m i n g s  identified by Warnick further limits the
usefulness of her response to Fisher.
In spite of these objections neither critic finds fault 
in the premise of the paradigm that aesthetic and emotional 
uses of communication may be effective elements in the 
construc t i on of per 3  LI -i'l\ 3 .1 V © ATI © 3  3  c& g e s „ A s w i 11 b e d i s c u s s e  d 
in the following section the relationship of aesthetic and 
argumentative uses of language has been developed more fully 
in the theories of literature and language of Kenneth Burke,.
Rhetoric. Emotions, and Behavior
Though the relationship between rhetoric as reasoned 
discourse and literature as emotional or cathartic discourse 
has been discussed for centuries, it is in the work of 
Kenneth Burke that the inseparability of logical and 
emotional discourse is most apparent,, An innovative thinker 
and advocate of "the new rhetoric" Burke (1963b) proposes a 
definition of persuasion that has implications for 
rhetorical theory. Specifically Burke's discussion goes
beyond traditional definitions of rhetoric that focus on 
"reasoned discourses"
Here is perhaps the simplest case of persuasion. 
You persuade a man only insofar as you can talk his 
language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitude, idea, i dent i f vi nci your ways wi t h h i s. 
Persuasion by flattery i s but a spec i a1 case of 
persuasion in general. But flattery can safely serve 
as our paradigm if we systematical1y widen its meaning, 
to see behind it the conditions of identification or 
consubstantiality in general. And you give the "signs"
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o f  s 1.1 c h c d n s u  b s t  a n t  i a 1 i t y b y d e f  e r e n c e t o a n a u d i e n c e y s
"opinions" (p., 55!-'.
Withi n thi s d e f i n i t ion y two  ideas a ra  o f  p art i  c u 1 ar  
interest to the present study,, The first is that B u r k e ’ s  
implied definition of language e x t e n d s  far beyond discourse 
to include actions and behaviors,, This position is implicit 
in dram a t i s rn w h e r e b y  h u  m a n b e i  n g s a r e a n a 1 y z e d a s  o n  e w o u. 1 d 
c r i  t  i q u  e  a  c  t o  r s  i n  a p 1 a y . A c t o r s p e r f o  r  rn r o  1 e s b y m e a n s o f  
speech and gesture each providing the m e a n s  for 
communicating ideas and feelings to the audience. Burke 
chooses to focus on language because he believes all thought 
and knowledge must necessarily proceed through language.. 
But persuasion f o r  Burke is a  process o f  identification and 
t h e  means f o r  ac h i ev i n g  i dent i f i c at i on can i n c 1 ud e the 
a c t i o n s o f  o t h a r s .
For Burke then persuasion may occur in the absence of 
speech or discourse if behavior "speaks" in such a way that 
it identifies with the "language" of the audience,. Other 
scholars have noted the ability of action to argue in 
conjunction with or in place of speech,, For example
K auffman Cl9SI) e xtends ar g umen t t o d r amatic p r oduc t ion s in 
which "verbal and nonverbal forms combine to aid the 
audience in forming judgments about the credibility of a 
in e s s a g e " Cp. 413) „ F o r !< a u f f rn a n r h e t o r i c a  1 p r o p e r t i a s o f 
poetic language are evidenced in appeals to audience 
participation„ .Dramatic characters act and speak to their
engage them enthymemat i cal 1 y in the drama tic process;. For 
example Kauffman observes that in dramas like Aeschylus’ 
□ rests.! a "poetic-rhet o r i c a 1 disc o urse attempts to speak t o 
the moral, ethical, and social problems which seem to inhere 
in h uman soc i et y " Cp, 413)„ However ha notas that "on1y the 
audience members can supply the necessary propositions;; 
’this person is like me’ or ’these things could happen to 
me’" Cp. 4151, In this sense the audience provides the
m is sing or unstated link in t h e arg urnen t i mpIi ed by the 
per formance,
Campbell (1932) argues that "theatre depends upon the 
example for its rhetorical force" (p„ 13)., By force
Campbell means the imaginative involvement of the audience 
in the action presented on stage or in the least some 
emotional response to the action on stage,, Campbell further 
s u g g e s t s t In a t r h e t o r i c a 1 t h e o r y n e e d s t o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e 
differences between traditional concepts of argument and 
emotional appeals:
I am suggesting that the rhetorical effectiveness of 
plays is not based upon sound argument,, For instance, 
Antony’s funeral speech in Julius Caesar is an
interesting rhetorical a ct„ . „ bu t i t c an ha r d1y b e 
c al1ed an argument . Antony’s pi ay on words y h i s
sarcasm, and the emotional appeals involving Caesar’s 
cloak and his mutilated body do not qualify as reasoned 
progressions from premises to conclusions Cp. 17).
Campbell’s example from Jul1 us Caesar notes that audiences 
may be persuaded by means other than "sound argument."
Like the "good reasons" suggested by Fisher the emotions 
roused by Antony in Julius Caesar serve to persuade the 
audience that Antony's is the better position., The point 
here is that the emotional appeals in the social context.of 
the mob combine to achieve persuasion (i. e„ the movement to 
action advocated by Antony) where the "reasoned arguments" 
of Brutus fail. Moreover Antony's speech and action are
not simply examples in favor of his cause,. He 1 dent i f 1 es 
his position with the sympathies and feelings? indeed the 
af fective state of the audience. They ar a moved not hy the 
strength of Antony's reason but by the shared emotional 
experience of the situation. The conspirators against 
Caesar have argued reasonably,, Though Brutus' speech has 
emotional dimensions in his stated love of Caesar these 
feelings are subordinated to the quite rational needs of the 
state,, The mechanism of persuasion is the contrast of 
e m o t i o n w i t h t h e need f o r r a t i o n a 1 d e c i s i o n •- m a k i n g i n 
national affairs. Caesar's death is de-personalized by the 
superordinate needs of the state. Anthony's persuasion 
counters not through rebuttal but by qualitatively changing 
the d imen s i o n s of e va1u a t i on f r om r at i on a1 to emotion a1 
ones. As Campbell implies the use of emotional appeals is a 
wholly a p p r op r i at e p ersuas i ve st r a t e g y i n s ome
c :i. r c umst an c es.
The second idea from Burke's definition cogent to the 
present discussion is the importance of "an audience's
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'opinions.*" From this emphasis it i-s possible 
a focus on the reception of persuasive c ommuri i cat i on. For 
Burke effective persuasion not only considers the state of 
mind of its audience but actually defers to it,, Elsewhere 
Burke C1984') notes that deference of this kind is a
fundamental aspect of style and points out the difficulty to 
effective persuasion if audience needs are .ignored::
In its simplest manifestation,, style is ingratiation. 
It is an attempt to gain favor by the hypnotic or 
su g gest i ve p r ocess o f "saying the r ig h t th in g„ '1
Obviously, it is most effective when there is agreement 
as to what the right thing is. A plain-spoken people 
will distrust a man who, bred to different ways of 
statement, is overly polite and deferential with them, 
and tends to put his commands in the form of questions 
(saying "Would you like to do this?" whan he means "Do 
this"). They may even suspect him of "sneakiness."
He, conversely, may consider their blunt manner a bit 
boastful, even at times when they are almost consumed 
with humility. The ways by which the mannered speaker 
w ouId ingratiate himse1f wit h man ne red 1i stener s, or 
the plain-spoken one with blunt listeners, may thus 
become style gone wrong when the two groups cross (p. 
50) .
When considered in light of the definition of 
persuasion as identification viewing style as a means of 
ingratiation has important implications for rhetorical 
theory. While in the passage above Burke considers the need 
to "speak" in a manner acceptable to one's listeners the 
def ini t ion of persuasion of fered ear 1 i er rerni nds us that 
"speaking" may be used metaphorically. In persuasive
contexts messages may "speak" in a variety of ways to 
e.omrnuni cat e by gestur es, symbo 1 s, appea 1 s to stat us, or
-7 nr
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i r o n y t h e i dent i f i c a t i o n o f t h e r e c e i v e r w i th t h e rn e 5 s a g e.
This is a subtle shift in rhetorical theory.. While
m a n y r h e t o r i c i a n s f r o m Plat o a n d A r i s t o 11 e t h r o u g h C i e r o
and Quintilian recognise the importance of audiences for the 
s u c c e s s of o r a t o ry (F a r rel 1 , 19 8 5 y K ennedy, 19 SC!) f e w
advocate the superiority of the audi'enceJ s position over 
that of the orator. Vet in the mass media context deference 
to the wants of the potential consumer are the rule rather 
than the exception in the construction of persuasive
messages. As such mass media advertising provides a fertile 
gr ciund devel oping rhet or ical t heor y t hat ac c oun t s f or 
ingratiation as an organizing strategy in the construction 
of persuasive messages.
Beyond this definition of persuasion Burke notes that 
there are strictly formal qualities of communi cation s t y la 
th at 1i kewise ha ve p er suas i ve p ot en t ia15
At least, we know that many purely' formal patterns
can readily awaken an attitude of col laborati ve
expectancy in us. For instance, imagine a passage
built about a set of oppositions ("we do this, but they 
on the other hand do that; we stay here, but thev go 
there: we look up, but they look down. " etc,,). Once 
you grasp the trend of the form, it invites 
participation regardless of the subject matter. . „ .in
cases where a decision is still to be reached, a 
yielding to the form prepares for assent to the matter 
identified with it. Thus, you are drawn to the form,
not in your capacity as a partisan, but because of some 
"universal" appeal in it. And this attitude of assent 
may then be transferred to the matter which happens to 
be associated with the form (1969b, p. 58).
What constitutes form varies considerably when
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r ©m embered that p er suasion may be accomp1ish ed without 
discourse, strictly through gesture in some cases,. Formal 
appeal in this sense is a persuasive medium wholly separate 
from content elements, of the "message." Students of 
behavior will recognise the similarity of participatory
persuasion here as analogous to classical conditioning. 
Still a difference can be discerned in the often self-
c o nsci o us n a t u r e o f p a r t i c i pat ion i n t h e f o r m a 1 a 1 e rn e n t s o f 
per suasi ve c ommun i c at i on As Bur ke not es s
As for the purely formal kinds of appeal which we
previ ciusly men t i oned when t r y i ng to shcw how they 
invo1ve the p r incip1 a of ident ificaticn, thei r 
universal nature makes it particularly easy to shift 
t h e rn f r o m r h e t o r i c t o p o e  t i. c , T h u s, v i e  w i n g a  v e n 
tendentious oratory from the standpoint of literary 
appreciation rather than in terms of its use, Longinus 
analyzes "sublimity" of effect in and for itself.
Where Demosthenes would transport his auditors the 
better to persuade them, Longinus treats the state of
qua 1 i ty o f t he exc i t ement, and to d i sc 1 ose t he means by 
which it is produced Cp. 55).
In t hi s passage Bur ke makes an unchar ac t er i st i c ci i st i nct i on 
between rhetoric and poetic. The pass-age recognizes that 
p ci ci r r het or 1 c m a y s till be a p p r e c i a t e d o n aesthet 1 c t e r m s. 
Poor rhetoric may simply mean an ineffecti ve a11empt at 
persuasion. Eve n so ther e re ma ins t he ■ s ense in which 
someone who "agrees" to participate in the aesthetic form is 
more closely "associated" with the subject matter "which 
happens to be associated with the form" Cp. 53) than someone 
e 1 se wl-io does not make t he c onsc i ous swi t ch f r om pr act i ca 1
to aesthetic concerns. In the Julius Caesar example cited 
earlier someone who rejects the "arguments" of Antony 
because they do not correspond to traditionai expectations 
of logical reasoning may yet admire from an aesthetic 
per spect i ve the sty 1 e Antony emp 1 oys in his speech tid the 
mob. This kind of admiration links aesthetic appreciation 
t ci r h et or i ca 1 design by s t y  1 i s t i c i ngr a t i a t i o n  . Tla :i. s  1 i nk 
by means of style provides a more subtle means for
estab1i shing i dent i f icat ion between message and audi ence 
than more traditional linkage by way of argument.,
In chapter four this emerging conceptualization of 
ingratiation through aesthetic means for rhetorical ends is 
applied to the advertising campaign of B e n s o n  and Hedges 
cigarettes (See Appendix A). In the mass media context of 
print advertising the use of visual appeals in the form of 
social interaction may suggest cues to behavior or attitude 
formation without use of discursive copy,, The syl i sties of 
ingratiation become realized in the visual image? appealing 
to the audience by the deceptively simple use of an implied 
soc i a 1 situat i on . In t he absence o f di scour se the audi ence 
i s ccin f r onted on 1 y wi th a p i ctur e of gr idup i nteract i on . As 
Hoviand, Jan is, and Kelley (1953) note "communications which 
call attention to group membership may prompt the individual 
t o t ak e ac c ount o f g r oup nor ms i n f or mi n g h i s opin i on on a 
given issue." <p. 271). In the Benson and Hedges ads the
"given issue" is cigarette smoking,. The rhetoric of
peripheral persuasion argues that in the absence of 
discursive appeals to engage in issue-relevant thinking the 
audience for the ad will "take account of group norms in 
f or m i ng h i s I her , t h ei r 3 op i n i on . "
Even when considered in terms of discourse persuasion 
may incorporate various paradigms that change the meaning of 
"reasoned discourse." Traditionally reasoned discourse has 
meant logical arguments supported by examples or 
probabi1ities. However recent trends advocate other models 
of discursive be h a v i o r a s per s uasi v e „
For example Farrell (1985) suggests that aesthetic 
appreciation of (and by definition participation in) 
rhetorical discourse is not only possible but inevitable. 
For Farrell "rhetoric viewed aesthetically is an intrinsic 
feature of the human condition" Cp. IS). Farrel 1 believes 
this characteristic of human beings to be a paradox when one 
attempts to use a "practical" art such as rhetoric. Despite 
the intention of practicality inherent in "traditional" 
rhetoric the tendency to see rhetorica1 di scourse
aesthetically cannot be denied. As Burke points out
aesthetic participation in the form of rhetoric invites 
identification and with it persuasion through .ingratiation.
Frerrtz (1985) places rhetoric in a conversational 
context that moralizes in much the same way as the narrative 
paradigm Fisher advocates. The conversation metaphor is
derived from the 1anguage-act i on paradigm of Frantz and
Farrell Cl976) As Fr entz C1985) desr ibes
Or :i. gi nal 1 y , the actional paradigm was a heuristic 
perspective on conversation designed to explain the
structure and meaning of varied instances of
interpersonal communication,, The paradigm consists of 
three hierarchi cal layers of context,, Form of life 
contexts are ranges of shared experience among agents—  
somet i mes c u 11 ur a 1 , somet i mes i n st i. t ut i ona 1 , an d
sometimes i nterpersonal. Encounter c ontexts are
physical locations where social actors are mutually 
aware of each other's presence,, Finally,, ep 1 sodi c
contexts —  those regions defined by conversations
t h e m s e 1 v e s —  a r e r u 1 e c o n f o r rn i n g s e q u e n c e s o f s y m b o 1 i c 
acts generated by two or more actors collectively
or i ented towar d emer g ent g oa1s C p . &)„
11 i s from this background that Frantz argues that 
rhe t o r i c a 1 c o n v e r s a t i o n h a s m o r a 1 izi n g q u a 1 i t i e s, W h s n 
morality becomes the topic of conversation these qualities 
c ombine in w h a t f o r F r e n t z i s a n u n u s u a 1 r hi e t o r ical
si tuat i on s
When conversations transcend encounter time,, the 
p a r t .i c i p a n t s e x p e r i e n c e t i m e o n a f o r m o f 1 i f e 1 e v e 1 . 
As its name implies, form of life is an historical 
concept —  fusing past and future in the present™ When 
agents experience the temporal holism of a form of life 
all at once, in the consciousness of the present in an 
on-going conversation, they place themselves in a 
narrative context in which past and potential 
conversations are experienced as an historical unity 
emerging in the present —  a unity whose evolving 
direction can be determined in part through cooperative 
action™ By experiencing time in this way, agents are 
c o m p e 11 e d to r e d i s c o v er t w b preconditi o ns t o rn o r a 1 
action; the unity of their individual lives as actors 
in a dramatic story, and the moral tradition within 
which the present narrative is being acted out Cp. 7).
The importance of this passage for the construction of 
a theory of peripheral persuasion is that Frentz identifies
two feat ures o f r het or i c a 1 pr oc essss a 1 so f ound :i. n
persuasive peripheral messages under low elaboration 
likelihood conditions™ First the emphasis Frente places on 
" c o o p e r a t i v e a c t i o n 1 a n d " t h e u n i t y of their i n d i v :i. d u a 1
1i ves as ac t ors in a d r amat i c st ory" und erscores th e
essentially social nature of rhetoric and persuasion,, 
Second the references to "dramatic story" and "narrative" 
reminds the reader that the aesthetic viewing of rhetorical 
processes includes the enactment of the aesthetics of 
rhetorical conversation. In this case the "audience" moves 
b e y o n d a p p r e c i a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c f o r m i n r h e t o r .i c t o
part icipation in the aesthetic form of rhetoric,.
Identification and ingratiation become more subtle as the 
participant lacks even the distance allowed a more passive 
observer„
Condit C1987a) also offers a model of rhetoric and 
per suasion that seeks the construct i on of public vi r tue as 
its goal. While accepting that the rhetorical conversation 
model proposed by Frentz is "constructive for the building 
of pr ivate vi r t ue t hr ough 1ocal soc i al si t uat i ons" Condit 
expresses doubt that Frentz’s model "does not help us to act 
morally in the public realm, nor to understand collective 
morality" <p. 94). She argues that public morality may be 
constructed because "public rhetoric req uires that an 
i n d i v i d ua 1 sp ea k a publ i c 1 an g uag e t In a t i n c 1 ud es 1 i n g u i s t i c 
commitments shared by all who are constituents of a
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community" (p. 82) . Cond.it refers to this public language 
as social discourse units.. For Condi t construction of a
public morality is possible through rhetorical means
because s
S ocial d i s c ou rse units carry mo r a1 i mpcr t beyon d
individua1 interest, in part, because they i ndicate 
shared commitments and prescribe what each person as 
member of a collectivity is obii gated to do within the 
collectivity.. More fundamental 1 y, these terms are 
moral because the public arena, by its very nature, 
requires the use of terms that match the essential 
requirements of morality —  the sacrifice of self 
interests for larger goods. Public argument centers on 
those greater goods because the contest between
competing interest groups leads each group to attempt 
to identify their interests with larger goods. Unlike 
t ha par t i c. i pants of private conver sat i ons, the "public"
does not endorse enactment of social policies for
apparently selfish interests. On1y when a policy can
be presented as bearing greater goods will it be 
e n d o r s e d C p. 82).
Though Condit would replace the rhetorical conversation
mode 1 wi t h her own " c o 11 ec t i ve ' c r a f t' " C p. S'3) met aphor
both she and Frentz underscore the importance of social
interaction and influence for rhetorical theory. To the
extent that persons are involved in either rhetorical
conversations or the collective crafting of virtue they are
participating in a process of persuasion.
«■> '«■ ..
While all these scholars cite Burke's works in support 
of their own approaches to rhetorical theory Fisher (1385b) 
observes the synthesizing scope of Burke's work;
Clin the- beginning, 1oqos meant story, rationale, 
conception, discourse, and/or thought. Thus, all forms 
of human expression and communication —  from epic to
o-~*'-J .1-
a r c h i t e c t u r e , f r o rn b i b I i c a 1 n a r r a t i v e t o s t a t u a r y—  
came within it purview. At least this was the case 
until the time of the pre-Socrat i c phi 1osophers, Plato, 
and Ar i st otie,. "As a resu 11 o f t h e i r t h i n k i n g, 1 oqos
and mythos, which had been conjoined, were dissociated 
Cp. 74)..
F i sher 1 at er 1i n ks Bur k e rs wor k w ith t h i s ear1i er coneept i on 
o f 1oqoss
Rhetoric, for Burke, is not purely an epistemological 
transaction; it is more fundamentally an ontological 
experience., It works by identification' rather than 
demonstration. As; his theory recognizes r eason as we 11 
as aesthetic qualities in all forms of human 
communication, it recaptures and rain forms the original 
sense of 1oqos Cp. 36).
From thi s discussi on i t s c 1 aar that Fi sher be 1 i eves 
that rhetorical theory incorporates all human activity 
i n s o f a r as i t h as t h e potent i a 1 to p e r s u a cl e o t h ers. H e r e i t 
seems appropriate to consider explicitly emotional behaviors 
and attitudes as potentially persuasive. Booth (1974) notes 
that "gut reactions" also have their place in rhetorical 
theory:
In short, every desire, every feeling, can become a 
g o o d r e a s o n when c a 11 e d i n t o t In e c o u r t o f s y m b o 1 i c 
exchange, „ , . It is true that "gut reactions" can be
very bad reasons for action. But so can logical
proofs,. The real art lies always in the proper
weighing —  and what i s prop er is a ma11 er f i naily o f 
shared norms, discovered and applied in the experience 
of individuals whose very individuality is forged from 
o t h e r selv e s C p . 16 4) .
Booth is concerned that what constitutes reasoning too often 
neglects recognition of emotional feelings as both
persuasive and in some cases preferable to rat .i onal i ty in 
decision making Cpp„ 162-167)» Hera and in other places 
Booth reiterates the dual themes of emotions as legitimate 
elements in a theory of rhetoric and the understanding that 
who we are as persons is inextricably bound up in our 
interactions with others::
Not 'only do human beings suecessfu 11 y infer' other human 
beings' states of mind from symbolic clues; we know 
that they characteristical1y, in all societies, bui1d 
eac h ot her ' s minds.. Th i s i s ob vi ous know 1 edge —  a 11 
t h e mors genuine for being obvious;,. What an adult man 
or woman is, in all soc i et ies, is in larg e deg re e what 
other men and women have created through symbolic
exchange. Each of us "takes in" other selves to build 
a self Cp. 114),.
Li ke those theor i sts menti oned afccvs 3ooth bs1iaves 
that rhetorical theory needs to address social and emotional 
dimensions of human communication as legitimate persuasive 
devices or influences. Booth includes these dimensions in 
what he calls the rhetoric of assent. Whether in the
rhetoric of assent, the narrative paradigm, rhetoric viewed 
aesthet i c.a 13. y, rhet or i c-a 1 con ver sat i on , or r het or ical
craf t i ng of publ ic moral i ty the shi ft in emer gi ng rhetor i ca.1 
theory appears to be one in which emotions and social
i n f 1 i.i ences a re c o n sidered as dim e n s i o n s o f p e r s u a s i v e
communi cat i on .,
T h o u g h t h e t r e n d i n r h e t o r i c a 1 t h e o r y t o r e c o g n i z a t h e
place of emotional response in persuasion is encouraging
much of the language of the scholars cited above places
34
e m o t i o n a 1 a p p e a Is still in t h e c o n t a t o f c o g n i t i v a 
persuasive appeals,. Though an expansion of traditional
rhetorical theory these modifications leave several 
questions unanswered. For instance what is the role of
e m o t i o n o r affect in relatively u n c on s c i o us c o m m u n i c a t i o n? 
Can unconscious communication be persuasive? If persuasion 
as def i ned by Bur ke includes non-di scur si ve cornmuni cat iore 
what are the means for advocating some position or .another 
under such circumstances? In short what are the persuasive 
conditions in which emotion ail appeals combine with
peripheral cues to social influences as the featured 
"message" of persuasive communication? To answer’these 
questions necessitates constructing a theory of rhetoric for 
low elaboration likelihood situations.
The Rhetoric o f I...ow Elabora11 on !_i ke 1 i hood Per suasivs
Appeals
When considered in conjunction with Burke's expanded 
definition of persuasion the formal elements of 
communicative appeals are of increased importance.
Especially in those contexts where discourse is absent the 
aesthetic f or m of the communicat ive appea1 pr ovi des the
means for conveying persuasive messages,. In his discussion 
on ingratiation Burke observes that aesthetic appreciation 
of even blatant persuasive rhetoric may encourage
S5
identification where the "arguments" of the message fail. 
Just as individuals may be caught up in the participatory 
di mension of di scur si ve form it seems 1i ke1y t hat n on — 
discursive form invite tacit participation as well,. As 
H o viand, J a n i s, and l< ell e y C1353) n o t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a f 
features group membership invites consideration of the 
implied norms of the group when forming an opinion on an 
issue. In the absence of discourse reference to group norms 
becomes even more important for the recipient of persuasive 
c cimmun i >: at i on. I n c  hapter f our t he analysis o f t hie Ben son 
and Hedges campaign features discussion of ads with 
v i r t ua11y n o discour sa and visual appeals t o g roup 
interaction. As developed in the following chapter the 
rhetoric of peripheral persuasion suggests that persons may 
be persuaded t o p a r t i c .i p a t e in t h e non ~ d i s c u r s i ve f o r m of 
thie ad on an af fect i ve dimension „
Cac i oppo and Petty (1984a) predict that under low 
eI abor at i on 1 i ke 1 i hiood condi t .i. ons i ndi vi dua 1 s will not 
engage in issue-relevant thinking. Simply stated when
individuals are not personally involved with the subject 
matter of a persuasive appeal it is unlikely that they will 
cognitively process and evaluate the arguments supporting 
the appeal. Indeed it is quite the case that they will not 
participate at all in a "reasoning" process in the 
traditional rhetorical sense. So it may be that the person 
flipping through a magazine in a doctor’s office or watching
o cK.J K.J
an ad ver t i semen t on telev :L s .i on p ay s 1 i t tie " a11 en t i on '1 t o 
the "message." However it is possible that these same 
persons may have an affective response to the form of the 
presentation in these media,, In these cases the individual 
b ecomes ingratiated b y t he aest h et i c s of th e ad i i se1f. The 
aesthetic appeal of the aid should not surprise us since the 
production quality of advertising is often superior to other 
"messages" such as news or entertainment found in the same 
media.
The rhetorical dimension of the affective response to 
part icipat ion in the forrnal qualities of a persuasi ve appea 1 
I :L n ks t he st udy o f att i t ude f or mat i on an■::! change t o 
contemporary rhetorical theory. Because involvement in 
messages of low elaboration likelihood is low processing of 
information is done through peripheral routes,, While the 
individual may process the aesthetic dimensions of the ad 
peripherally it is important to note that this type of 
ingratiation is more subtle than Burks"s example. For the 
low involvement individual is unlikely to have switched from 
cognitive processing to peripheral processing. In short the 
recipient of peripheral persuasion may identify with the 
"message" or aesthetic image without recognising that he or 
she has done so. The implications for this kind of 
rhetorical strategy are discussed in greater detail in 
chapter four. But it does seem possible that peripheral 
persuasion offers a means for bypassing cognitive resistance
to attitude change,. If this possibility can be demonstrated 
t han t he r h at oric of peripheral per suas i on may si gnifica n 11y 
contribute to the development of rhetorical theory,
If we are persuaded to participate in the experience of 
a strictly affective response to some message then the 
subject matter of the appeal becomes tenuously connected to 
o ur a f feetive rsact i on, S u p pose for exa mpie a person sees 
an advertisement for a new car but is not at present 
considering buying one. Suppose too that this car is of 
foreign origin and that the reader of this advertisement has 
never considered owning a foreign made car. Since there is 
nothing in the reader or the advertisement to excite issue- 
relevant thinking we may suppose further that the
"information" in this advertisement will be processed 
per i pheral1y,
Peripheral processing features the emotional or 
affective dimensions of persuasive communication in the 
absence of issue-relevant thinking and cognitive processing,
In our example the car advert is©ment may emp1oy exce11ent 
color photograph, attractive models, beautiful scenery, and 
perhaps only enough discourse to encourage the formation of
a positive image of the car. This discursive information
may simply invite the reader to "remember" some feeling of
excitement and compare that affective state with the
experience of owning/driving the car in the advertisement, 
Does this advertisement qualify as a rhetorical strategy to
persuade its audience to the adoption of some particular 
at t i tuda?
I n t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a 1 e x a m p I e t h e a d v e r t i s e me ri t 1 s
arguing affect. It is not simply arguing affectively as
Antony”s speech in Julius Caesar does. Rather the reasoned 
and calculated strategy is the generation of affect; of a 
posi t i ve emot i ona 1 r esponse i nstead of a 1 ogi ca 1. r easoned 
conclusion about the car in the advertisement. This
strategy marks a departure in traditional rhetorical theory 
that recognizes that e m o t i onal appeals and r esponses may ba 
incorporated into arguments. It is part of a thaory of
rhetoric that rejects the hierarchical ordering of cognition 
above emotion in human communication, The rhetoric of
identi ficat ion implies that emotional and cognitive appeals 
may work in unison or independently as legitimate persuasive 
cJevices. They are interdependent forms of 1 anguage but 
separate in the sense that the routes to persuasion each
follows differs in how the information in the appeal is
acted upon by the receiver.
Identi f i cat i on versus Arguing A f f ec t
In a broad sense the rhetoric of low elaboration 
1i kelihood is a special case of the rhetor ic of persuasion 
t Inr ough i cl en t i f i c at i on „ I den t i f i c at i on i s ac h i eved t h r ough 
aesthetic ingratiation under low involvement conditions.
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Because .involvement is low issue-relevant thinking is 
un ,'L i kel y B u t  it is al so true t hat c ogn i t i ve awar eness t hat 
one is processing a persuasive message is equally absent. 
In short arguing affect necessitates conditions of low 
involvement combined with unique characteristics of both the 
message and its reception. These characteristics
distinguish arguing affect as a rhetorical strategy from 
arguing affectively. For convenience it is useful to
separate discussion of message characteristics from 
processing or reception characteristics.
Message Characteristics
The rhetoric of low elaboration likelihood uses message 
characteristics that are unlikely to elicit issue-relevant 
thinking on the part of the receiver of the message. 
Examples of these characteristics include use of music in 
ads or colorful photographs of beautiful models of either 
gender. This latter example applies only when the product 
or message does not specifically address attractiveness as 
some hair conditioners or cosmetic ads may. As such these 
messages will tend to favor non-discursive mediums of 
communication over discursive communication. Appeals to 
senses but not cognition might include pictures with little 
or no language present, use of music rather than description
yu
as accompaniment to images, and a dependence on non-verbal 
interaction among persons in the message as a substitute for 
reasoned verbal argument. These characteristics encourage 
low'elaboration likelihood reception for several reasons.
First pictures without desc r i p t i on do not aut omat i c ally 
engage cognitive processing in the way that reading or 
1istening must necessar i1y do. Language in the tradit iona1 
sense is a cognitive rational process. Information may be 
c omrnunicated wi t hout 1 anguage t holagh t he c omp 1 e i  ty of a 
given message might be limited under low elaboration 
likelihood conditions. For example social interaction may 
communicate the social acceptability of a product? s use in 
some si t us t x uns bu b may7 not .~pac x i y L f iv  ̂
acceptabi1x ty.
y descrxptxon can
e n hi a n c e a n e m o t x o n a 1 re s p o n s e to- a p e v s Lia s x v 11 e s a a g a 
providing the music itself does not become the focus of 
a11 ent ion C Bat r a and Ray, 1986). For exampie Gorn l1980) 
reports that music may be used to influence consumer choice 
behavior in a manner consistent with classical conditioning.
Thirdly th e us e of n on-verbal messa g es i mp1i e d in the 
interaction of persons in persuasive message appeals
features the social element of communication and persuasion 
d i sc ussed ab o ve L Boot h, 1 ’V~7,:i j; Bla r !■' e , 1969b ji 9amp b e 11 , 19’8a
a n d K a u f f m a n , 19 E! 1 > . I n c o n s t r la c  t :i. n g a r hi e t o r i c o f 1 o w
e 1 aborati on 1 i ke 1 i hood a11 ent i on t o t hie soc i a 1 d i mensi on o f
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persuasion is consistent with research in marketing that 
i clent i f i ss the i n f I uence of gr oup and aggregate bahavi or on 
the formation of an individual's attitudes,. For example 
N:i. sbett and Wilson (1977) suggest that membership in 
subcultural groups influences reports on decisiorv-making 
process;es. Subc u 11 ur a 1 gr oup member sh i p pr ov:i. das an avan 
more intensive exposure to social norms as influences on 
dec i si on-mak i ng. This tendency is consistent with the 
social influence postulated to occur in Frantzfs rhetorical 
conversation model and Condi t,3 rhetorical crafting 
metaphor. Solomon (1983) argues that product consumption 
helps individuals determine their place in the greater 
s o c i -a 1 s y m b o 1.1<.. o rW r n
[ C '1 o n s u m e r s e rn p 1 o y p r o d u c t s y m b o 1 i s m t o d e f i n a s o c i -a 1 
reality and to ensure that behaviors appropriate to
that real! ty will ensue. ....  product symbol.;, sm is
often consumed by the social actor for the purpose of 
defining and clarifying behavior patterns associated 
with social roles. The consumer often relies upon the 
social information inherent in products to shape self- 
image and to maximize the quality' of role performance 
(p. 320).
By way of example a consumer may buy an expensive Italian 
sports car because s/he values its "sexy" image. According 
to Solomon this purchase will both communicate this .image of 
self to others and encourage the consumer to believe that 
s/he has sexy attr ibutas as well., I f consumer s ar e usi ng 
pr oduc ts to c 1 ar i fy t hei r soc ;i. al r ol es th e n  i  t seems 1 i kel y 
11-1 at i n format ion about Ahose rolas may f unct i on as non™
v e r b a l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  p e r s u a s i v e  m e s s a g e ' s .
Of these message characteristics the focus on social 
influences communicated through non-discursive means 
represents a point of departure from Burke's definition of 
per suasion. Though Burke's de f i n i t ion i s ambi guous on
exactly what constitutes language it is clear from his other 
writings that he places the word at the center of human 
communication and meaning itself Ce„ g. Burke, 1966!) » Yet 
the non-verbal non-discursive social element of low 
elaboration likelihood persuasive appeals may communicate an 
emotional message that need not be cognitively processed in 
terms of language. As noted in chapter one-? Zajonc (.1.980) 
has demonstrated that individuals may have emotional 
responses in the absence of cognition altogether. Thus the 
rhetoric of peripheral persuasion extends Burke's concept of 
persuasion through identification beyond strictly language 
oriented views of meaning.
Recent i on Character i st ics
How a persuasive message is received is also a factor 
in the development of a rhetoric of low elaboration 
likelihood. As the ELM suggests low elaboration likelihood 
corresponds with low involvement in the processing of the 
message on the part of the receiver. The primary
characteristic of reception then is a lack of issue-relevant
thinking™ Arguing affect is a persuasive strategy
specifically designed for by-passing cognitive processing 
structures.
It is in this charactaristic of reception that arguing 
a f f ec t ma y b e seen as a d i men s i on o f r h e t or i c a I t h eo r y mo s t 
c1sar1y . Si nca i n mo31 cases cogni t i on causes indi vi duaI s 
to evaluate persuasive messages along logical or reasonable 
grounds it is mors difficult to overcome objections that may 
stem from the subject matter itself™ For example while an 
individual m-ay not find t he r eason i ng behi i nd a c i gar e11 a 
a d v e r t i semen t obj ec t ion ab1e t he ar o u sa1 o f cognit i ve 
p r i:ocessing st r uc t ures wi 11 I :i. kel y i nc 1 ucle that per son ? s 
k n o w 1 e d g e of the cl angers of cigarette sm o k i r. g cl erived f r o m 
ot her sour c es „ Si mi 1 ar 1 y a po 1 i t ical c andi dat ss9 ar gurnen t s 
m a y e n g a g e c o g n i t i v e a p p r a i s a 1 o f o t h e r a s p e c t s o f h i s o r 
her candidacy,, In sum it may be difficult to contain the 
parameters of cogni t i ve pr ocessi ng once i ssue-r e1evant 
t h in ki ng has been engaged.
I f the avoidance of cogriitive procassing i s a 
rhetorical goal then the concept of arguing affect emerges 
as a potentially organising mechanism for the formation of 
persuasive messages. By emphasizing the characteristics of 
low elaboration likelihood appeals one may increase the 
chances of persuading through the generation of an emotional 
response as the basis for further decision-making. More 
simply once an emotional response or affect is part of the
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individual* s overall experience it becomes a factor in 
subsequent responses of persuasi on inc1uding cogni tive
p r o c e s s ing. F o r e x a m p 1 e i f t h e a u t o rn ob i 1 e i ndu s t r y w e r e t o 
c r eat e a p osi t i ve emot i on a 1 r espon3e t idwar d domest i c c ar 
manufacturers in general then one might expect those persons 
exposed to the persuasive message to support more readily 
tariffs against foreign car manufacturers. The emotional 
c ontponent of their experience be c o m e s a f a c t o r i n t h e 
mediation of subsequent arguments asking them to consider 
the merits of establishing tariffs.
Of course in most instances emotional appeals can be 
more affectively linked to cognitive appeals under high 
involvement situations. But there will remain opportunities 
for p e rsua s ive c ommuni c at ion i n wh ich 1ow a1 abor a t i on 
likelihood will' predominate,, It is under these
circumstances that arguing affect may be a preferable 
r h e t o r i c a 1 s t r a t e g y.
Summary
This chapter has identified the rhetoric of low 
elaboration likelihood as a special case of rhetoric by 
identification. The usual application of identification as 
a means of persuasion emphasises discourse and cognition in 
the reception process. In contrast the rhetoric of low
e 1 ab cir at i on 1 i ke 1 i hiood suggest s • t h at t he ar ousa I o f emot i on
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can itse1f be the desired end of pevsuasive communication. 
Under such circumstances avoidance of cognitive processing 
of persuasive information may be a direct attempt to avoid 
the consequences; of issue-relevant thinking. In both cases 
persuasion by means of identi ficat ion includes ingratiation 
through partici pat ion in aesth etic form. Un der 1ow 
elaboration likelihood conditions aesthetic form wi11 be 
usually restricted to non-discursive forms such as visual 
i mages»
While it see m s 1ike1y t h at amo t i o n a11y b ased peri p h ara1 
cues may be used in conjunction with more direct appeals to 
cognition in most c i r c urnst an c es the possibility of utilising 
peripheral appeals as the pr1 mary vehicle for persuasive 
communication exists. Chapter four exami nes three samples 
of this strategy in a recant Benson and Hedges advertising 
campaign. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
implications of arguing affect for rhetorical theory and 
suggestions for further study.
CHAPTER FOUR
In the p r e v i ous chapter condi t i ons that f avor 
p er i p h er a 1 p e r suasiva appeals as t h e s t rat egy of c hoi c e in 
the construction of persuasive messages were identified. 
Conditions that favor the use of peripheral appeals include 
low elaboration likelihood on the part of the message
recipient and message characteristics of non-discursive 
c ommun i cat ion favo r in g vi sua1 i mager y t ha t may c onv ey
implicit norms of social interaction. This chapter
approaches three examples of advertising from a recent 
Benson and Hedges campaign (see appendix A) from the
standpoi nt of per i pher a1 per suasi on as t he pri mary
rhetorical strategy.
From a rhetorical perspective consistent with the
discussion in chapter three the "persuasion" of the Benson
and Hedges campaign exists on a number of inter-woven 
levels. Consistent with the work of Hovland, Janis, and 
Kelley (1953) the lack of written description in the ads
leaves the interpretation of the visual .image more or lass
to the receiver of the message. In two cases (figures one 
and three) there exists an implied though ambiguous social
9 7
interaction,. In figure two there is only one person
presented but clues toward the social context of this ad 
exist and will be discussed at greater length later. The 
p o i n t h e r e i s t h a t t h e d o m i n a n c e o f t h e v .i. s u a 1 i m a g e 
w i t h o u t a c o r r e s p o n d i n g d i s c u r s i v e d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e s o c i a 1 
interaction meets one of the conditions favoring peripheral 
persuasion„
The quality of the visual image in all the ads also
!-i e 1 p s m e e t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p e r i p h e r a 1 p e r is u a s i o n „ A11 o f 
t h e ad s use so f t co1or s an d i n t wo cases C f ig ur as on e and 
two> a1so use a soft foeus exposure. This literally makes
the picture "less clear.," But more i importantly the
aesthetic appreciation of the image is enhanced by the
techniques of lighting* color selection, and soft focus. 
The use of a "slice of life" presentation in which the
person or persons present seem to be going about their daily 
routine also has rhetorical i m p1i c at i on s. Speci fically the 
"slice of life" format aims at increasing potential 
identification by something along the lines of "these people 
are like me" in the minds of the audience for the ad. 
Consistent with the conditions set forth by Burke C1969b') 
these ads a\llow the receiver to appreciate the strictly 
formal qualities of the ad without necessar i1y a11ending to 
the "message" of the ad at all. In short the conditions for 
rhetoric by ingratiation thorough participation in the 
aesthetic appreciation of the ad enhances peripheral
p e r 3 u a s i o n .
Finally the lack of substantial discursive 
communication in the ads reduces the likelihood that the 
r a c i p i e n t o f t h e a d s will e n g a g e i n i s s u e - r e 1 e v a n t t hi i n k i n g „ 
In these ads one would expect issue-relevant thinking to 
canter on the decision whether or not to purchase Sensori and 
Hedges c i gar e11 e s H o w e  ver c onsc i ous cons i der at i on o f 
cigarette smoking may also trigger negative connotations 
associated with health hazards in cigarette smoking. In the 
absence of a communicative mechanism to trigger issue- 
relevant thinking the ads encourage low elaboration
likelihood processing,, As the ELM predicts peripheral
persuasion may be more successful under low elaboration 
1 i k e 1 i h o o d c o n d i t i o n s „
Wi th these condi t i ons in mi nd thi s chapter examines the 
three Benson and Hedges ads in appendix A. The rest of
this chapter is divided into four parts. The first section
analyzes the content of the ads with particular attention to 
the social interaction implied by the visual image in each 
ad. The second section discusses the processing of the ads 
under low elaboration likelihood conditions as predicted by 
the ELM. The third section considers how an under standing 
of the rhetoric of peripheral per st.ua si on enhances an 
appreci at i on of t he range of means availab1e f or per suasi ve 
communication. The fourth section summarizes the rhetoric 
of peripheral persuasion and suggests directions for future
study.
Ad Content;: Visual Images and Normative Cues from Implied
In the Benson and Hedges ad in figure one, two people 
are seen in reposed conversation in a series of three 
photographs. The first two of these photographs show what 
seems to be an attentive younger woman listening to a well 
d r e s s e d older m a n s p e a kin g t o h e r o n s o m e t o pic of i n f o r rn a 1 
conversation. The third photograph shows the same couple 
but much more closely than either of the first two shots. 
The effect of this close-up is that the audience for the ad 
i s 1 i ter ar y closer and by impl i cat i on mor e i n vol ved i n t hie 
relaxed context of the interaction. Considered sequentially 
the third and larger photograph shows the couple in react.;, on 
t o some aspec t o f t hei r c on ver sat i on . Bot h per soins ar e 
smiling and/or laughing. The verbal portion of their
interaction is not transcribed. The only ad copy present is 
a simpl e statement s "For peop I e who 1 i ke t o srnoka „ . .
Bens on & Hedges because qua1ity ma11 er s . " A dditional 
disc u rsive commu n i cat ion is f ound i n t he S urg eon Gen e r a1fs 
Warning in the lower right-hand corner of the ad.
Closer examination of the ad in figure one reveals some 
subtle relational messages. The close proximity of the
couple indicates some level of intimacy. Their physical
100
d'i st anc e ser ves a dec ep t i ve 1 y dual f un c t i on . On t he on e 
hand it: c oramun i c at es a level of intimacy from their
intrusion into each other ' s personal space (Hall,, 1966 ) . On 
the other hand there is a subtle sense- in which the audience 
is included in this intimate exchange,, On at least a
symboli c exchange level the audience for the ad shares in
t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f t r u s t a n d i n t i rn a c y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f
intimate relationships- The subjects' facial expressions 
an d ey e c on t ac t sug g est fc ot h f r i en d 1 i n ess an d i n t er est 
TIn ei r 1 oc at i on on a c iduc h with plant s i n t he bac kgr oun d 
e n h ances an impre s s .ion of infor m a 1 i t y.
In this visually pleasant context the woman is smoking 
a cigarette- From the ad the social interaction may be
deter mi necl t o be congen i a 1 and f r iend 1 y . Less c er t ai n i s
the nature of the relationship. We do not know whether this 
couple has a friendship or romantic relationship,, Possibly 
the man is the woman's father- In the absence of any
discourse that might clarify this relational ambiguity is a 
distinguishing characteristic of the ad. However cl'oser 
examination of the ad reveals the possibility that 
relational ambiguity may be a deliberate part of the ad's 
persuasive strategy„
As noted in chapter three Burke (1969b) observes that 
the formal elements of a message maty overshadow the content 
of a message in some cases,, Under low elaboration
likelihood conditions the aesthetic appeal of message
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constructi ons serves as a peripheral cue in the processing 
of the message,, In figure one with its absence of central 
cues tci engage i n issue-• relevant thi nking the aesthet i c 
dimension of the ad is necessarily featured,, The relational 
ambiguity of the couple in the ad is not only contained in 
the aesthet i c for m but is enhanced by i t„
(As d i si';ussed above the coupl e i n f i gur e one seems 
engaged in a re 1 axed in forma 1 conversat i on . Ve 1; ther e ar e 
mixed signals as to the status of their relationship that 
are contained by the aesthetic dimension of the ad. For 
example the blue couch and relaxed at tire and pose of the 
woman may indicate an apartment setting,, The presence of 
the plants and the ceramic pot holding the plant immediately 
behind the man further suggest the informality of a 
r a s i d e n c e. !•■! o w e v e r t h e man i s d r e s s e d in a b 1 u e t In r e e -
piece pin-striped business suit,, Hi s busi ness attire 
contrasts sharply wi th her casual dress i n a whi ta 
s1eeve1es s biouse and kh a k i possi b1y knick er b ocker s p ants. 
His formality is further suggested by a starched white shirt 
with crisply pressed cuffs. Apparently the man is visiting 
the woman either at her home or in an office setting more 
likely associated with her "style" than with his. To
further confuse the nature of their relationship the woman 
is wearing a traditionally man’s watch on her right wrist. 
We do not know if it is the man’s watch, the watch of a 
third party, or a watch she has purchased for herself,, What.
is evident is that it is unusual to see a man's watch on the 
right wrist of a woman.
In figure two there are only two photographs and a 
single female subject in both,, The setting of figure two is 
less ambiguous; that in figure one,. The woman is figure two 
is clearly in a bathroom,, Though uncertain it seems likely 
that the bathroom is in a residence. The tiled bathtub and 
the free-standing porcelain sink together with the other
furnishings around the sunken bathtub indicate a residence,.
Also as in figure one the lighting comes from a background
window and much of the visual field is in blue,, Whereas
figure one contained mostly dark blue the tiles in "igurs 
two are light blue.. Figure two also lacks ad eery accept 
for the same message about Benson & Hedges cigarettes found 
in f i g u r e o n e „
The woman in figure two is bare-shoulderad and wrapped 
in a linen sheet. In the first and smaller picture she is 
smiling holding a cigarette and seeming to reea11 some 
memory with fondness or mirth. In the second photo she is 
seated and taking a long inhalation from her cigarette,.
T h o u g h a 1 o n e in figure tw o t is e a 11 i r e o f t h e w o m a n 
suggests possibilities about social interaction that are 
ambiguous. The choice of a rumpled sheet as attire may be 
insignificant though the stereotypical use of a sheet as 
clothing after sex is fairly frequent in mass media 
entertainment in television and film. Additionally the
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w ci m a n i s w i t h o u t s u b s t a n t i a 1 m a k e - u p a n d w i t h m e s s y h a i r .
Whether this woman has just risen frcm a nightTs sleep or
has left a lover in another room is indeterminable,, What is
0certain is that the receiver of this ad is again asked to 
participate in an intimate setting through the aesthetic 
dimension of the visual ad. Once again the smoking of a 
cigarette is part of that interaction.
The informality and intimacy of both figures one and 
two imply a relationship to the ad on the part of the 
receiver that enhances participation in the aesthetic form 
of the message. The rhetorical dimensions of this strategy 
will be explored in more detail in the third section of this
Fi gure three a 1 so has two photographis. Each photograph 
shows two featured people with an undetermined number of 
others in the background. The featured couple in figure 
three are a man and a woman. Both are casually dressed. 
The man is seated and reading a paper in a typewriter before 
him. He is dressed in a b1ue kni t short-sleeved sports 
shirt and has a yellow sweater wrapped around his neck, The 
woman is standing behind him in the first picture and then 
appears to be crouched behind and to his side in the second. 
She is wearing a white sweater with white pants and a red 
shirt and bandanna on her head. She has her arm around the 
man”s shoulder and he appears to be showing her something on 
the byped page.
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As i n t h e ot in er f i g ur es t he p eop 1 e i n f i g ur e t hr ee a 1 so 
seem to be :L nvol ved i n an int i mat a rel at i. onsh i p» 
Indications of intimacy may be found in their close 
proximity* her arm around his shoulder, his apparent sharing 
of some point or insight with her. Unlike the other figures 
figure three presents a more public context,. Though the
exact location of the photographs in the ad is uncertain the
b ac k g r ound ind i c at es glass door s and at 1east t wo oth er 
persons in conversations
The difference between figure three and the first two 
ads is that smoking as part of the social interaction is
moved into a more public social contest, As with the
ccincerning the r e 1 at i onshi p of thiose pi ctur ed or ar gument s 
addressing smoking-relevant issues,, The "message" of all
three ads available to the receiver is largely dependant 
upcin the i mp 1 i ed nor ms of the soc i a.1 cont ext „ Under tinese
0 o n d i t i o n s the persuasive i m p a c-t o f t h e a d s i s c o n v e y e d 
largely through peripheral appeals.
Ad Processing Under Low Elaboration Likelihood Conditions
The ELM predicts that without any explaining copy 
attending t h e ads and in t h e a b s e n ce of som e s pec i a .1
1 n t e r est in t h e a d s o n t he p a r t o f t h e r e c e i v e r t In e
1 rs
information present in the ad will be processed by the
p e r i p h e r a 1 r o u t e t o p e r s u a s i o n „ A d d i t i o n a 11 y t h e a b s e n c e
of any clarifying rules about the relationship of those
p i c t u r e d s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e i m p 1 i c i t n o r m s o f t h e i nt e r a c t i o n 
will convey a persuasive message of affect,, The message of 
these ads suggest several possible meanings,.
Because the ads lack the cues to participate in i ssue- 
'relevant thinking the conditions are ripe for the aesthetic 
dimensions of the ads to serve in a persuasive capacity™ As 
noted in chapter three Burks (1963b) argues that aesthetic 
form may arouse a "collaborate expectancy in us" generating 
an "attitude of assent" Cp „ 53),, From this attitude the
feelings aroused by participat ion in the aesthetic form may 
be "transferred to the subject matter which happens to be 
associated with the form" (p., 53).
The key to understanding peripheral persuasion lias in 
t h e c o n c e p t u a 1 i z a t i o n o f t h e p hi r a s e " p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t hi e 
aesthetic form" and its implications for rhetorical theory. 
The ELM predicts that peripheral routes to per "3 Li 3  3  .1 Ci f") V" 0  
more effective when involvement is low and attendance to 
central cues is absent,, Participation is a somewhat
ambiguous term. . In the usual sense participation implies an 
involvsment on t he p ar t o f t h e p art ic i p an t. Ho we v e r Bur kefs 
use of the term is not limited to a conscious decision to 
engage the aesthetic dimension of form. Rather Burke
believes that attendance to formal qualities in message
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p r esen t at i on may be rel at i ve 1 y un c on sc i ous.
More simply the "universal" quality of aesthetic form 
i s i t s soc i a 1 and shared c ommun i c a t v a  pr oper ties. For
Burke participation in aesthetic form may follow either of 
two general paths,, As indicated earlier in chapter three 
(Burke, 1969b) one path to participation in aesthetic form 
may be through conscious appreciation o f the desi qn of a 
message,, In this vein Burke notes that "viewing even
tendentious oratory from the standpoint of literary
appr ec i at i on r ather t han i n t er ms o f i t s use, Longi nus 
analyzes 'sublimity5' of effect in and for itself" (p. 55),
However it is by means of the second path that 
participation in aesthetic form may be relatively 
unconscious. Burke calls this means "purely formal 
patterns" that "awaken an attitude of collaborative
uses the example of "a set of oppositions" in which "once 
you grasp the trend of the form, it invites participation 
regardless of the subject matter" (p. 58)., Burke argues
t h at ur member ship i n var .i ous c ornmun i t ies i s gr oun ded .i n 
ci u r ability t o r e c o g n i z e a n d d e m o n s t r a t e c o m m u n i c a t i v e
competence,, It is for this re a s o n t h a t r hetor i c a n d
a e s t In e t i c s a r e i n s e p a r a b 1 y 1 i n k e d a c c o r d :L n g t o B u r k e 9 s 
perspective,. Social meaning is persuasive because of its 
shared nature. In the present example the aesthetic form
o f the a d s e m b o d y the s o c a I cues "o f i dent i f icat i o n o r
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consubstant ial i ty in general" (p 55). For Burke it is not 
even a ease of choosing to accept the aesthetics of a 
message while rejecting the rhetoric of the message.
Recognition of the existence of the aesthetic form of
message presentation is evidence of participation.
At first glance this line of reasoning seems
tautologically true. In a gross sense we understand
messages because they "speak our language." By the same
t oken t he pr oid f t hat messages "speak idur 1 anguage" i s f idund 
i n the fact we understand them. But th i s i s an
oversi mpl i f i cat i on of a ver y complex pr idcess. In the case
o f aestheti c for m par ticipation may p r oceed with out 
conscious recognition that one i_s participating in an 
extrinsically designed path to message processing. It is
the ability to participate unconsciously in the form of
c ci m m u n :i. c a t i o n t h a t c o n is t i t u t e s u n i v e r s a 1 a p p e a 1 . T h i s i s a n 
essential ingredient of the rhetoric of peripheral 
persuasion. Participation in aesthetic form whether
c o nsciously or n ot provides t he aven ue for "ingrat iat ion" as 
Burke uses the term. Identification and with it persuasion 
follows from participation in aesthetic form.
The rhetoric of peripheral persuasion may be more
subtle still. As noted earlier Zajonc (1930) has
d emon st r at ed t h at e x p osur e a 1 on e h as 1h e cap ac i t y t id 
influence emotional responses to messages. Though Burks’ s 
discussion of ingratiation is more complex the conceptual
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taasis i s similar to the work of Za.jono. In short the 
processing of information by peripheral routes requires only 
enough attention to permit exposure of sufficient length to 
assimilate the visual image of the ads.
In the ads in appendix A the visual image presents 
e i t h er a social c on t e x t ( f i g ur es 1 an d 3 > i n wh i c h an 
ambiguous but pleasant social interaction exists or an 
equa 11 y amb i gnous c ont ext with per haps some i mp 1 i. c at i ons f or 
a social context (figure 2). Though the ads cannot
determine how involved its potential receivers will be it 
can and does severely limit inclusion of cues to central
processing. The choice to use very little copy, to refrain 
from a discussion of related issues Ci. e. "quality" is not 
even defined), to present an ambiguous situation that relies 
on social cues for interpretation, favors processing via 
per iphera 1 routes <Wyer and Car 1ston , 1373) The ads
simply do as little as possible to encourage high 
elaboration likelihood and processing v i a central routes.
Peripheral Appeals and the Means to Persuasion
The rhetoric of peripheral persuasion expands the 
parameters of existing rhetorical theory by incorporating
aesthetic form and social interaction into rhetorical
processes. The wor ks of such theor i sts as Burke, Fi sher, 
F a r r e 11 , and F r e n t z provide the con c e p t u a 1 b a s i s f o r
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consideration of aesthetic form as a means to persuasion., 
As noted in chapter three the work of Hoviand, Janis, and 
Kelley C1953') suggests that social interaction in the form 
of group membership and implicit cues to normative behavior 
rn a y in f 1 u e n c e p e r s u a s ion,, The ELM p r o vid e s a m o d e 1 fo r 
understanding how individuals attend to messages ' and 
recognizes that processing of persuasive information
involves characteristics of both the message and the 
receiver. Beyond the synthesis of these disparate
approaches to persuasion the rhetoric of peripheral 
persuasion discussed in the present chapter offers a means 
for identifying rhetor i cal strategies previously outside the 
parameters of rhetorical theory.
' The most important contribution of the rhetoric of 
peripheral persuasion lies in its identification of the use 
of aesthetic low elaboration likelihood messages as the 
primary strategy for persuasion. In contrast to ELMfs
pr edi cti on that per i phera1 per suasion will be ephemera1 t he 
arguing affect model predicts that under certain 
circumstances peripheral persuasion may be enduring and 
highly resistant to counter-argument.
Under low e 1 ab or at i. on 1 i ke 1 i h ood c on d i t i on s p r ocessi n g 
of the ads will likely be limited to an affective response 
to the social interaction in the ads,, In the absence of 
cues to central processing the cues for evaluation may be 
d e r i v e d f r o m t h e s o c i a 1 i n t e r a c t i o n (. o r i n f i q la r e 2 t h e
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i ntra-act i on > pictured in the ads™ . If enough exposure or 
multiple exposures to the ads are available the affective 
response to the ads may become part of the long term memory 
of the recipient,, In related research Mitchell (1936)
cone 1ud es t ha t s
t h e v i s u a 1 c o m p o n e n t i n a d v e r t i s e m e n t s m a y a f f a c t b o t h 
the formation of product attribute beliefs and the 
attitude toward the advart i sement. Both of these 
components then have an effect on brand attitudes™ » ™
the results demonstrate that although A,a<j ft he
attitude toward the ad3 and brand attitude are related
when attitudes are formed in an advertising context; 
they appear t o measur e separ at e hypot hiet ical const r uc t s 
(p ™ 23 5 »
The premiss of the arguing affect model draws suppor 
the research of Mitchell (1936)™ To some extent the affect 
generated by parti c i pat ion in the aesthetic forrn of tha ad 
is separate from the attitude one holds about Benson and 
Hedges cigarettes and perhaps cigarette smoking in general„ 
Under 1ow el aborat i on 1i ke1i hood cond i t ions t h i s separ at i on 
may lead the audience for the ad to respond more to the 
affect generated by participation in the aesthetic form of 
the ad than to the formation of attitudes about the 
cigarettes™ At this point the subtle social interaction 
cues embodied in the ad become part of the recipient's 
"personal knowledge" on th e sub jec t o f smo k i n g ™
Here i t i s useful tid dist inguish what tar get audisnces 
exi st based apon the formal structur e of the ads. The 
rhetoric of identification assumes the existence of a
11*!x X x
co(nmuni t y or "audience" t o wh i ch t he si gns o f
c on sub st an t i a1i t y may be conveyed. Based upon this
understanding of Bur ke1s definition of persuasion the 
rhetoric of ingratiation is possible only to those persons 
who may "participate" in the form of a message because they 
already understand its "language." As discussed earlier in 
this chapter participation does not necessarily require
c o nscio u s r e c o g n i t i o n that the individual i s r e s pond i n' g to 
the aesthetic form of the ad. This is similar to the claim 
made by Fisher that "one does not have to be taught
narrati ve pr obab i1it y and nar r at ive f i deli t y ; one c ult ur ally 
acquires them through a universal faculty and experience" 
(p. 15). For both theorists the appeal of form is
universal partly because participation does not depend upon 
some conscious or even s e .1 f—r e f 1 e x i v e a c t i v i t y „
There are at least two broad categories of audiences 
for the Benson and Hedges ads. These categories are 'smokers 
and non-smokers. Smokers seem the most obvious target as
the ads are attempting to sell cigarettes and address 
themselves to "people who smoke." But it is in the non- 
smokers1' audience that the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion 
described in this chapter may have its most important 
impact. In this sense the ads may serve not as a selling 
tool but as propaganda.
If the ads are viewed as propaganda* a\imed at non™ 
smo k er s th e socia 1 cues i n the ads t ake on new mean i ngs.
1 1 2 '
Cigarette smoking in this new context is seen as an 
acceptable part of social interaction,, The non-smoker is
even more vulnerable to this strategy since s/he will be 
1ess 1i kely to feel addressed by the ad dirac11y and be more 
inclined to participate in the aesthetic form of the ad.
Once the ad becomes part of the non-smokerys long term 
memory an inter est i ng dy nami c becomes poss.i b 1 e f r om t he 
st andpoin t of persuasi on . W h i 1e under 1ow s1 abor at i on
1 i k e 1 .i h o o d c o n d i t i o n s t h e a d m a n i p u 1 a t e s p r o x e m .i c and o t h e r
non— -/erbal cues to create a positive affective response in 
the recipient toward the pictured interaction. Subsequent
exposure to this and similar ads may strengthen this 
response without subjecting it to a more critical 
exami nat ion of the "arguments" as wou1d be expectad under 
high elaboration likelihood conditions. But when the ad is 
retrieved from memory it becomes part of a cognitively based 
information and/or decision-making process.
For the non-smoker the cognitive process influenced by 
these ads may address social con cern s about smok i n g i n
general. For example individua1s asked to respond to
sur veys of a11 itudes toward smc>king in public may inc 1 u.de 
n o n - s m o k e r s » The r h e t o r i c o f per i p h e r a 1 persuas j. o n
predicts that the non-smoker who has participated in the 
aesthetic form of the ads will be more tolerant of public 
s m o k i n g t h a n t h e n o n - s m o k e r w In o h a s n o t s e e n t h e a d s.
Another aspect of the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion
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that utilizes social interaction as argument is found in how 
the arguments' of social interaction may be expected to be 
.judged. Since peripheral persuasion operates under low 
e 1 ab or at  i on 1 i ke 1 i h oocl c on d i t i on s ".judg e men t 1 ’ o f ar g ument s 
will not be a conscious or necessarily logical process. 
Acceptance or rejection of the arguments of social 
interaction will be based upon the nature of the interaction 
i tself»
The relative intimacy of the ads suggests that 
participation in the aesthetic form of the ads will be 
an a1ogous to participation in conversa t i on„ As n ot ed i n 
chapter three Frantz (19S3) argues that participation in 
conversation generates different criteria for the evaluation 
of arguments t han t hose pres umab1y oper ating in more 
traditional rhetorical contexts. The unity of the
participant of the ad with the social interaction in. the ad 
b1ur s t he d i st i nc t i on t hat separat es t he c ri teri a of t he 
audience from the normative behavior of the social 
interaction. Because the pictured ads include both smoking 
and the tolerance of other s to i t par t i c .i pat i on i n the 
aesthetic form of the ads subtly generates a rhetorical 
process of persuasion through identification.
Pr edi ct ions of thi s sor t of course need to be tested 
empirically especially as the rhetoric of peripheral 
p er suas i on a 11 amp t s t o sy n t h es i z e s c i an t i f i c: an cl sp ec u 1 at i ve 
approaches to the study' of persuasion. However in terms of
1 1 4
the present study the significance of this example is that 
it allows for the by-passing of cognitive obstacles to 
persuasion by utilising aesthetic appeals under low 
elaboration likelihood conditions. Arguing the merits of 
allowing cigarette smoking in public contexts in the face of 
m ountainous medica1 evi dence agai nst such pract ices seem 
difficult at best. Aesthetic appeals simply include
s m o kin g a s p a r t o f an on- g o i n g p 1 e a s ant s o c i a 1 in t e r a c t i o n.
The rhetoric of peripheral persuasion predicts that 
under low elaboration likelihood conditions it may be 
possible to use social cues to normative behavior to 
generate affective responses to the message. If the
aesthetic dimensions of the message are also featured then 
peripheral rhetoric may persuade through ingratiation and 
identification. Such an approach expands the parameters o* 
rhetorical theory by identifying the elements of situations,
message characteristics, and audience characterist:
necessary for successful use of aesthetic means toward 
rhetorical ends.
Summary and Suggestions for Further Study
The rhetoric of peripheral persuasion synthesises 
approaches to the study of persuasion from scientific and 
speculative directions. Based upon The Elaboration
Likelihood Model of Persuasion CCacioppo and Petty, 19815
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19S6b; and Petty, Kasmer, Haugtvedt, and Cacioppo, 1987) the 
rhetoric of peripheral persuasion integrates developments in 
contemporary rhetorical theory that stress narrative models 
f or communicat i on (Fisher , 1984) wi tPi theoret i ca 1 wor ks
addressing the interaction of rhetoric and aesthetic uses of 
language (Burke, 1969a; 1969b; 1984). From this synthesis a
number of dimensions to the rhetoric of peripheral
persuasi on may be ident i fied.
First peripheral persuasion is most likely to occur 
under .1 ow e 1 abor at i on 1 i ke 1 i Piood condi t i oms. Low
e 1 aboration 1 i kel i hood c ond i t i ons i nc 1 ude use o f per i phier a.1 
persuasive cues such as visual images that do not elicit 
issue-relevant thinking.. Low elaboration likelihood is also 
c or r e 1 at ad wi t h 1 ow i n vo 1 vement.
Second peripheral persuasion is more likely to occur 
when particular message and receiver cPiar ac t er i st i c s are 
present. In addition to those peripheral cues identified 
wit Pi low elaboration 1 i kel i hood conditions the rhetoric of 
peripheral persuasion emphasises aesthetic dimensions of 
persuasive messages especially those which manipulate social 
interaction. This aspect of peripheral persuasion has
important implications for current research in rPietorical 
t h e o r y t Pi a t li t i1i z es narra t i v e m o dels. I n s Pi o r t t Pi a
potential for aestPietic form to elicit participation as a 
precursor to persuasion through identification marks a new 
dimension to tPie parameters of rPietorical tPieory.
:!. 1G
Thir d p er i p h eral p er suas i on i s more 1i k e1y to occur i f 
consideration of message content is made in a different 
context,. This means that the affective response to
peripheral appeals is later recalled from memory in 
different but related context. The example of the non-
smoker responding to a survey about the rights of smokers to 
smoke in public stresses the use of the product of
peripheral persuasion in a different context.
This last aspect of peripheral persuasion suggests that 
empirical research on the predictions of the rhetoric of 
peripheral persuasion may further link scientific and 
speculative approaches to the study of persuasion» Other 
areas of research may include marketing,, management j, and 
p ci 1 i t i c.a 1 r h et or i c ,.
Research in marketing may help discover differences in 
the effectiveness of peripheral persuasion for low cost 
versus high cost items. The use of peripheral persuasion to 
target broader audiences than those typically associated 
with the customsr base of a busi ness may have implications 
f o r marketing s t r a t e g y . F o r e x a m p 1 e the w o r k o f W e 1.1 s
C 1.975) uses "psychoqraphics" in the identification of target 
markets and seems ideally suited for use of peripherally- 
b a s e d p e r s u. a s i v e camp a i g n s „ R a t h e r t h a n i d e n t i f y :i. n g
custonier groups by t r adi t i ona 1 demogr aphi cs or pr oduct use 
characteristics Wells segments markets by shared 
psychological needs. Prominent in the needs categories are
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asp i r at i ona 1 needs. Asp i r at i ona 1 needs may i nc 1 ude 1 ong•• 
range plans for financial and material success or they may 
simply include dreams and fantasies for an "ideal"
lifestyle- As aspirational needs become more aligned with
fantasy the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion that
incorporates aesthet ic for rn as the medi um for adver tising
ma y e n h a n c e p e r s u a s i o n a n d c o n s u m e r b e In a v i o r -
Already a number o f f i r ms appear t o use per i pher a1
appeals as t he bas i s o f t In e i r promot i ona 1 ac t i v  i t y -
Advertisements for such products as Chanel perfume, Calvin 
Klein designer fashions, and Coca-Cola all seem to rest upon 
peripheral appeals- Chanel's "share the fantasy" series is 
a surreal montage of high-status images of planes, pools, 
designer living interiors, and landscaped environments.
Certainly the appearance of these.ads on television reaches 
an audience far wider than the one that actually lives the
suggested lifestyle- The "shared fantasy" is virtual
participation in that lifestyle apparently by using Chanel 
products.
Designer fashions also make use of peripheral appeals 
to persuasion in both print and non-print media- The Calvin 
Klein products offer a particularly vivid example- Their 
line of perfume ("Obsession") is often promoted in magazine 
print advertising by means of a tangled mass of bodies 
photographed in black and white- The ad is highly
suggesti ve and erot i c in what i s c a11 ad '1 g ood . tas ta" but
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again the "message" of appeals to engage in issue-relevant 
t hin k i n g in a t rad i ti on a 1 sen se is not ab 1 y ab sen t. 11 is
literally an arousing ad that depends upon the creation of 
affect for participation in the aesthetic form of the ad.
The arousal of the ad is for the completion of the aesthetic
form not for consideration of product characteristics in as 
they are usually conceptualised in marketing.
Ads for Calvin Klein clothing are similarly devoid of 
invitations to "reason" about the characteristics of the 
product. In both print and non-print ads well dressed and 
a 11 ra c t i ve people stand isolated f rom one an o t her in b1 ac k
and white photographs or film. In non-print ads, movement
is also surreal usually in siow-moti on and accompanied by 
echoing synthesizer music. The value of these products and 
even the status of them is not meant ioned. Only the image i s 
presented and one presumes that participation in the image 
is made available by buying the product.
This last point directly addresses the rhetoric of 
peripheral persuasion. In advertising persuasion is
measured by behavior (. i . e„ sales). From a strictly 
t heoret i c a1 per spec t i ve t he r het ori c o f p er i p h er a1 
persuasion may be discussed in terms of identification. 
Theoretically speaking par t i c .i pat i on in aesthetic form may 
be accomplished imaginatively. Even in the public context 
of shared "universal" appeals an individual may internalize 
participation. In contrast persuasion in advertising
1.19
depends upon completing the form through an overt act of 
consumpti on „
The "Max Headroom" television ads provide another 
example of how peripheral- appeals substitute emotional 
processing for rational thought in a persuasive context'. 
The existence of Max Headroom only in the high-tech world of 
television and computers identifies the target market of the 
ad. Participation in the wor1d of Max Headroom c a n  o n 1y  be 
an imaginative exercise. The significance of the Max
Headroom ads lie in the exclusiveness of that world. In the 
ot h e r examples p er i p h er a1 per suas i on a f f or d s a mo ra 
e f f i c i e n t m e a n s f o r e v o k i n g p a r t i c i p a t i a n t h a n c a n t r a 1 
routes to persuasion afford. In the case of Max Headroom 
participation in the form of the ad is the on1v avai1able 
means to per suasi on. No rati ona1 means to per suasion can 
concretize the world of Max Headroom. But participation in 
the aesthetic and imaginative world of the ads creates an 
identification where traditional reasoning cannot. Once 
again the act of consumption is the vail i dating test of the 
persuasive effectiveness of the ad. But unlike the other 
examples noted above where a "real" world equivalent exists 
for the "fantasies" of the ads no "real" world Max Headroom 
"club" of Coke drinkers conversing with their computer- 
generated leader is possible.
Research in management communicat i on may exp.1 ore the 
use of peripheral persuasion in the dissemination of
120
corporate culture to various corporate publics. Especially 
i n r e1 ati on t o stor yte11ing to organizati ona1 socializati on 
the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion may help focus 
attention on the aesthetic elements of organizational 
stor y t el 1ing. For e xample Br own (19S5) obs e r ves that
stor ies toId by emp 1 oyees to newcomers about how the 
o r g a n i z a t i o n o p e r a t e s a r e m o r e e f f e c t i v e a s a m e a n s f o r 
socialization than are "official" communications in the form 
of job descriptions and procedure manuals- Perhaps further 
research may identify whether or not successful stories make 
use of greater aesthetic devices than unsuccessful stories.
Research in political communication may also'benefi t 
from consideration of peripheral persuasion as a preferred 
rhetorical strategy- By attending to the rhetorical elements 
of aesthetic form the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion may 
help generate new theoretical models of persuasive
communication in political campaigns- For example the 1980 
Presidential campaign of Ronald Reagan made use of ads that 
featured peripheral persuasion tactics- In particular the 
Republicans ran an ad featuring a bear wandering the
wilderness as a symbol for the Soviet Union- The United 
States was visually represented by a costumed American 
Indian. While the ad did feature a voice-over the story' was 
highly allegorical featuring phrases likes "Some say there 
is no bear in the woods. - - " and, "But if there is a
bear, we need someone who will face the bear..... " This
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entire ad featured only participation in the story itself as 
a means to persuasion,, At no time were the economic t 
political j, and/or military aspects of superpower relations 
addressed in accordance with "the issues." But the
powerful image of a man facing down a bear generated' a 
strong emotional response. The literal interpretation 
Ci„ e. the rational response) of the ad is ridiculous:; Man 
faces bear •—  Man can win. But the emotional dimensions of 
p a r t ici p a t i o n i n t h e a e s t h e t i c f o r m o f t h e a d hi a v e p o t e n t i a 1 
persuasive power. Like the ads for consumer goods political 
rhetoric also invites participation thorough overt action. 
Unlike traditional rhetoric ads of this type "speak" to 
images of cultural/national identity through shared symbols 
conveyed by per i pheral appea1s.
In sum the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion argues 
affect. In contrast to the use of emotional appeals in more 
traditional rhetoric the rhetoric of peripheral persuasion 
seeks the creation of affect through participation in 
aesthetic form as its purpose. Re ri p h e r a1 p e r suas i on does 
n ot ar g ue f o r i t s t ar get t o t h i n k emot i on a 11 y,. Rat h er 
peripheral persuasion argues to be emotional and to act upon 
the emotion by participating in the form. This link is
b a s e d u p o n t h e u n i v e r s a 1 a p p e a .1 o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n 
aesthetic form. The strength of this dimension of rhetoric 
lies in its potent ial to bypass cogni t i ve obstac 1 es to 
persuasion that may resist cognitive deliberation.
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